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THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF /NEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
RICHARD KLEIN*
Many scholars and professionals have identified a crisis in the
provision of defense services in this country. In Strickland v. Washing-
ton,' the first time the Supreme Court considered what standard
should be used to assess the constitutionally required effective assist-
ance of counsel,2 the Court had the opportunity to issue an opinion
that would have mandated widespread reforms at the state level simi-
lar to those inaugurated by Gideon v. Wainwright' and Argersinger v.
* Professor of Law, Touro Law School. J.D., Harvard Law School.
1. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
2. Id. at 683. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend VI. Whereas several colonies in America,
long before the Revolutionary War, acknowledged the defendant's right to assistance of
counsel when he requested it, only Connecticut actually provided for the appointment of
counsel for the indigent defendant. See WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
AMEFICAN COURTS 14-18 (1955) ("[In Connecticut,] the custom of appointing counsel if
the accused requested this assistance apparently existed after 1750. In addition, the court
usually advised the prisoner of this right to have counsel, and appointed one without re-
quest where the accused seemed to labor under some handicap."). After America achieved
independence, eleven of the thirteen colonies adopted new constitutions, and seven of
these new constitutions made some provision for the right to the assistance of counsel. Id.
at 18-21. For nearly 150 years, the Sixth Amendment was not understood to require the
provision of counsel to those who could not afford to hire their own. In 1932, the
Supreme Court held that an indigent defendant in a capital case had the right to an ap-
pointed attorney. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). Six years later, the Court
held that any indigent defendant in a federal prosecution must be provided counsel be-
cause the assistance of counsel is "one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed
necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 462, 467-68 (1938).
3. 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (holding that, for felony prosecutions, the Sixth
Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and requires the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants); see also
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 743 n.9 (1994) (noting that, under Gideon, "the
Constitution requires that an indigent defendant [in all felony cases] be offered appointed
counsel"); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (stating that counsel should be
provided where a probationer or parolee requests counsel, based on a timely and colorable
claim that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions of his liberty);
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (plurality opinion) (finding that Alabama's
preliminary hearing is a critical stage of the criminal process and thus requires counsel);
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (holding that "a lawyer must be afforded at [a]
proceeding whether it be labeled a revocation of probation or a deferred sentencing"); In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (finding that the Due Process Clause requires appointment
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Hamlin.* Although commentators were quick to offer sharp criticisms
of Strickland,5 the negative impact of that decision, from the vantage
point of fifteen years later, is even greater than feared.6
I. THE DEVELOPING THREAT TO THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright was long
overdue. The Court had previously refused to mandate counsel for
indigent defendants in all felony cases, but instead had instituted a
vague standard requiring counsel only when the denial of an attorney
of counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings that can result in commitment to an
institution).
4. 407 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1972) (holding that "no person may be imprisoned for any
offense, classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel
at his trial"); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (holding that Argersinger
requires the appointment of counsel in misdemeanor cases only when the judge deter-
mines that the defendant will be sentenced to jail if convicted). But see NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, Task Force Report on the Courts,
Standard 13.1 (1973) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT], reprinted in NATIONAL LEGAL AID
AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, THE OTHER FACE OFJUSTICE app. 158, 158 (1973) [hereinafter
LEGAL AID] (asserting that "[p]ublic representation should be made available to eligible
defendants ... in all criminal cases" from the time of arrest through the exhaustion of all
avenues of relief from conviction); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE
SERVICES, Standard 5-5.1, at 61 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE] (calling for counsel to be appointed in cases where, even though a conviction for the
offense would not lead to immediate incarceration, the conviction might subject the de-
fendant to future imprisonment were he to be convicted of a subsequent offense).
5. See Richard Klein, The EmperorGideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Consti-
tutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 639 (1986)
(charging Strickland with "seriously undermin[ing] the remedy available to a defendant
receiving ineffective representation"); Richard L. Gabriel, Comment, The Strickland Stan-
dard for Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise
of Due Process, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1259, 1288 (1986) (criticizing the Strickland Court for
"fashion[ing] a test for ineffective assistance of counsel that sacrifices the explicit rights
stated in the sixth amendment on a judicially created altar of fairness").
6. The negative impact that Strickland has had may be illustrated by People v. De Pillo,
565 N.Y.S.2d 650 (App. Div. 1990). The District Attorney initiated prosecution of the de-
fendant after the applicable period set forth by the New York state statute of limitations
had expired. Id. at 650. Counsel for the defendant, however, failed to move to dismiss the
indictment on the ground that it was time-barred. Id. The defendant was convicted, and
appealed on the basis that the defendant would not have been prosecuted at all were it not
for counsel's ineffectiveness. Id. The New York Appellate Division acknowledged that the
indictment indeed would have been dismissed but for counsel's incompetence; however, in
this post-Strickland world, the court refused to vacate the judgement of conviction because
"[the failure to make a pretrial motion, even one that might be successful, does not, per
se, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. (citing People v. Rivera, 525 N.E.2d 698
(N.Y. 1988)). The court seemed almost to go out of its way to commend the attorney,
observing that "trial counsel moved to dismiss... posttrial." Id. at 651. At that point, the
motion was useless because the New York statute required that such a motion be made
within forty-five days of the arraignment, a period of time that had long expired. See id. at
650 (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw §§ 210.20, 255.10).
1434
1999] INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 1435
would be "shocking to the universal sense of justice."7 Immediately
after Gideon was decided, Congress passed the Criminal Justice Act of
1964 in order to provide remuneration in federal cases for the repre-
sentation of indigent defendants.' The Supreme Court, however, did
not concern itself with either the manner in which states would com-
ply with Gideon or how they would finance their new obligation.9
States were loathe to spend what was necessary, and often chose to
provide counsel in a manner driven exclusively by considerations of
cost. A crisis was predictable.1"
Within several years of the Gideon decision, a Presidential Com-
mission warned that there was a "severe" shortage of lawyers repre-
senting indigent defendants which was "likely to become more acute
in the immediate future."11 The Report of the Commission sharply
criticized the representation provided to defendants and described
them as "numbers on dockets, faceless ones to be processed and sent
on their way."12 Several years later, the National Legal Aid and De-
fender Association published the results of a nationwide study, which
concluded that "the resources allocated to indigent defense services
have been found grossly deficient in light of the needs of adequate
and effective representation. " "
7. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
8. Pub. L. No. 88-455, § 2, 78 Stat. 552 (1964), codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A (1994).
9. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (noting that 22 states argued as
amici for the result achieved in Gideon, that two states opposed it, but failing to address the
costs to the states of appointing counsel for indigent defendants in felony cases). See gener-
ally EMERY A. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF THE AVAILABILITY OF
LAWYERS' SERVICES FOR PERSONS UNABLE TO PAY FEES 13 (Greenwood Press 1971) (1951)
(discussing isolated examples of indigent defense systems before Gideon, including the
Legal Aid Society in New York, which has operated since 1917, and early public defenders
in Los Angeles and Columbus).
10. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 55-56 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (not-
ing the Solicitor General's prediction that the rule in Argersingerwould result in "backlogs,"
"bottlenecks" and "chaos" at the state court level). But see id. at 44 (Burger, J., concurring)
(stating with optimism that "[t]he holding of the Court today may well add large new
burdens on a profession already overtaxed, but the dynamics of the profession have a way
of rising to the burdens placed on it").
11. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 151 (1967) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION].
12. Id. at 128 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dean Edward Barrett).
13. LEGAL AID, supra note 4, at 70; see Laurence A. Benner, Tokenism and the American
Indigent: Some Perspectives on Defense Services, 12 AM. CRuM. L. REv. 667, 684 (1975) (discuss-
ing this study and asserting in its light that "[t]he scope of representation provided for
indigent defendants in many jurisdictions does not meet specific construction directives of
the Supreme Court"); C. Anthony Friloux, Jr., Equal Justice Under the Law: A Myth, Not a
Reality, 12 AM. CPM. L. REV. 691, 707 (1975) (stating that "there has been little awareness
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In 1979, the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants began a three year study analyzing
thirty-seven indigent defense systems;" this study revealed an "exceed-
ingly depressing picture of insufficient defense financing." 15 This
alarming conclusion led three committees of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, in conjunction with the National Legal Aid and Defender As-
sociation, to hold hearings and to issue another report: Gideon
Undone: The Crisis in Indigent Defense Funding.1 6 The Report focused in
part on the inequalities that result when indigent defendants have to
rely on public defenders and court-appointed counsel who are so in-
adequately funded as to threaten the "constitutional mandate" of
Gideon.
17
In 1986 the American Bar Association formed a special commit-
tee to analyze the relationship between efforts to control crime and
the constitutional rights of citizens.1 Two years later, the Commit-
tee's Report concluded that the quality of counsel provided to indi-
in many cities, counties, and states of the obligation to the indigent, and even less affirma-
tive action to incur the financial cost to rectify the failure of the obligation").
14. This study was begun after the American Bar Association's House of Delegates
voted to approve the following resolution:
Resolved, that the American Bar Association supports in principle the establish-
ment of an independent federally funded Center for Defense Services for the
purpose of assisting and strengthening state and local governments in carrying
out their constitutional obligations to provide effective assistance of counsel for
the defense of poor persons in state and local criminal proceedings.
See Norman Lefstein, Criminal Defense Services for the Poor: Methods and Programs for Providing
Legal Representation and the Need for Adequate Financing, 1982 NBA. STANDING COMM. ON
LEGAL AID i (reprinting the 1979 resolution).
15. Id. at 15. The Report's Introduction stated:
Millions of persons in the United States who have a constitutional right to counsel
are denied effective legal representation. Sometimes defendants are inade-
quately represented; other times, particularly in misdemeanor cases, no lawyer is
provided or a constitutionally defective waiver of counsel is accepted by the court.
Defendants suffer quite directly, and the criminal justice system functions inef-
ficiently, unaided by well trained and dedicated defense lawyers. There are also
intangible costs, as our nation's goal of equal treatment for the accused, whether
wealthy or poor, remains unattained.
Id. at 2.
16. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N & NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASs'N, GIDEON UNDONE: THE
CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING (John Thomas Moran ed., 1983) [hereinafter GIDEON
UNDONE]. The Report itself somewhat hedged on the title, indicating that the promise of
Gideon "will indeed be undone" if the enumerated problems are not addressed. Id. at 1
(emphasis added).
17. Id. at 3.
18. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINALJUSTICE IN A FREE SOCIETY, CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE IN CRIsIs 1 (1988) [hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS].
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gents is "too often inadequate because of the underfunded and
overburdened public defender offices."1 9
The quality of counsel provided in death penalty cases has been
subjected to particularly harsh criticism. Witnesses appearing before
the American Bar Association's special Task Force on Death Penalty
Habeas Corpus characterized the quality of counsel provided indi-
gents as "shameful," "abysmal," "pathetic," and "deplorable."20 The
Report of the Task Force concluded:
Without any doubt, the inadequacy of representation at the
trial level greatly increases the risk of convictions that are
flawed by fundamental factual, legal, or constitutional error.
Too often, due to inadequacies of counsel, the jury never
gets to hear evidence that could thoroughly alter its view of a
case.... It is simply unrealistic to expect the system to oper-
ate better when its most fundamental component-in-
formed, diligent, and effective advocacy-is missing at the
trial level, the "fountainhead of justice."21
One of the nation's foremost capital case litigators and scholars, Ste-
phen Bright, has written that as a result of the lack of funding for
counsel in capital cases, "there is simply no functioning adversary sys-
tem in many states."22 In a particularly damning attack on our justice
system, Bright concludes that it is not the facts of the crime, but in-
stead the quality of the representation which determines who gets the
death penalty, and that often "the poor were defended by lawyers who
lacked even the most rudimentary knowledge, resources, and capabili-
ties needed for the defense of a capital case."23 Justice Blackmun, dis-
senting from a recent decision by the Supreme Court to deny
certiorari in a death penalty case where the defendant claimed inef-
fective assistance of counsel at trial, provided one reason why he
would no longer uphold the sentence of death in any case: "My 24
years of overseeing the imposition of the death penalty from this
Court have left me in grave doubt .. whether the constitutional re-
19. Id. at 9.
20. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, CRIM. JUST. SEC., BACKGROUND REPORT ON DEATH PENALTY
HABEAS CORPUS ISSUES 69 (1989) [hereinafter BACKGROUND REPORT], reprinted in Ira P.
Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM.
U. L. Rv. 1, 53 (1990).
21. Id. (quoting Warren Burger, The Courts on Tria/, 22 F.R.D. 71, 79 (1958)).
22. Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but
for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1844 (1994).
23. Id. at 1842. Bright, the Director of the Southern Center for Human Rights in At-
lanta, Georgia, describes the system for providing financing for indigent capital defendants
as "a process that lacks fairness and integrity." Id. at 1837.
1999] 1437
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quirement of competent legal counsel for capital defendants is being
fulfilled."
2 4
In response to the continuing nationwide crisis in indigent de-
fense services, the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section
again formed an ad hoc committee to analyze the situation.25 The
1993 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indigent Defense Crisis
concluded that "[t]he long-term neglect and underfunding of indi-
gent defense has created a crisis of extraordinary proportions in many
states throughout the country."26 Although this Report focused on
the representation provided indigents in state courts, the same unfor-
tunate conditions exist in federal courts. The Judicial Conference
of the United States formed a Committee that same year to assess the
effectiveness of counsel provided indigents under the Criminal Justice
Act.2" The Reporter to the Committee, Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., subse-
quently observed that there was a great deal of testimony from public
defenders "who explained how their inability to provide effective
24. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1264 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from de-
nial of certiorari). Blackmun added the obvious, yet horrid truth: "The consequences of
such poor trial representation for the capital defendant, of course, can be lethal." Id. at
1259; see also Hearings on H.R 3 Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciay, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (testimony of Gerald H. Goldstein,
President, Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers) (arguing that there is a high level of
constitutional error caused by under-compensated, unprepared attorneys because the
states have failed to meet their obligations at the trial level of capital cases).
25. See RicHARAD KLEIN & ROBERT SPANGENBERG, INDIGENT DEFENSE CiusIs (1993) (estab-
lishing the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indigent Defense Crisis). The formation of this
Committee was prompted in part by conditions like that in Atlanta, where a local newspa-
per characterized indigent defense representation as "slaughterhouse justice." Meet 'Em
and Plead 'Em, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT, Sept 18, 1990, at 2. The caseloads of each
defender averaged 530 felonies, and the lawyers responded to this burden by terming ar-
raignment day as "meet 'em and plead 'em." One staff defender who nevertheless picked
up forty-five new cases from working one arraignment session made a motion to the court
to limit her new cases in the future to six cases a week. Id. The Director of the Public
Defender Office, knowing perhaps that his job would be at risk if his office were not
processing the required number of cases, demoted the staff defender, who subsequently
resigned. Id.
26. KLEIN & SPANGENBERG, supra note 25, at 25. See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer &
David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting Effective Representation Through
Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice forAll Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CraM. L. REv. 73,
74-75 (1993) (proposing reforms because "the results of existing indigent defense methods
are often abysmal and because the need for effective reform is acute"); J. Michael McWil-
liams, The Erosion of Indigent Rights, A.B.A. J., March 1993, at 8, 8 (proposing various re-
forms to ensure that the rights of indigent defendants are not violated).
27. KLEIN & SPANGENBERG, supra note 25, at 1-2 (noting that "all components of the
criminal justice system are suffering from the lack of adequate resources").
28. See COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE CRIMINALJUSTICE Acr, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO
REVIEW THE CRIMINALJUSTICE ACr (1993), reprinted in 52 CRIM. L. REP. 2265 (1993).
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assistance of counsel was a direct result of the inadequate resources
made available to them under federal law."29
In the mid 1990s, when many states were confronted with re-
duced revenues due to a sluggish economy, indigent defense delivery
systems were one of the first places that states and counties looked to
reduce costs.3 ° A Special Committee of the American Bar Association
minced no words in describing the situation: "[T]hejustice system in
many parts of the United States is on the verge of collapse due to
inadequate funding and unbalanced funding."3 1 No place perhaps
was as hard hit as Orange County, California-the fifth largest county
in the United States-which filed for bankruptcy in December 1994.32
That county, which had been the country's fourth richest,33 decided
to save money on indigent defense 4 by drastically reducing the pro-
gram for court-appointed private attorneys to represent indigent de-
fendants where an impermissible conflict of interest would arise if the
Public Defender's Office were to represent two or more co-defend-
29. Charles Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58 LAW
& CONTEMp. PROBS., Winter 1995, at 81, 86; see State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784, 789 (La.
1993) (finding unconstitutional a local public defender system under which one attorney
had represented 418 clients in seven months with 70 felony cases pending trial, and noting
the trial judge's remark that "not even a lawyer with an 'S' on his chest could effectively
handle this docket").
30. See David J. Carroll, 1997 State Legislative Sessions Scorecard: Developments Affecting
Indigent Defense, THE SPANGENBERG REP. (West Newton, Ma.), Nov. 1997, at 1, 2.
31. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON FUNDING THE JUST. Sys., FUNDING THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM: A CALL TO ACTION ii (1992).
32. See Merrill Lynch, Orange County Settle, Assoc. PRESS ONLINE, June 2, 1998, available in
1998 WL 6674881 (discussing the bankruptcy of Orange County). Orange County was not
the only area in California to suffer. In San Diego, the 1992 budget shortfall led to the
Public Defender's Office losing $538,000 and the Alternate Public Defender losing
$100,000. See No Layoffs at S.D. Court, but Offices Face Cutbacks, L.A. DAILYJ., Oct. 15, 1992.
Even before the cut, the Public Defender Office had no funds available to fill fourteen
vacant positions. Id. In 1992 in Alameda County (Oakland), the county sharply cut its
budget and the public defender's office was scheduled to suffer the greatest reduction.
The defenders had had their budget cut in each of the two preceding years, even though
caseloads had increased. The Alameda County Public Defender reacted sharply to the
proposed reductions: "No reasonable person can look at this budget cut and say it's doa-
ble. We couldn't handle the caseload. Wejust couldn't." Less Money Fights More Crime, L.A.
DAILYJ., Apr. 6, 1992.
33. John Greenwald, The California Wipeout, TIME, Dec. 19, 1994, at 55, 56.
34. See Sonia Y. Lee, Comment, OC's PD's Feeling the Squeeze-The Right to Counsel: In
Light of Budget Cuts, Can the Orange County Office of the Public Defender Provide Effective Assist-
ance of Counsel?, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1895, 1913 & n.135 (1996) (noting that, after bank-
ruptcy, the council formed to operate the county's budget proposed the most severe
reductions in programs affecting the poor, including defense attorneys, and that the
budget of the Alternate Defense Fund, which provided private attorneys to indigents in
conflict of interest cases, was cut 29%, and restructured in its relation to the public de-
fender office, in sharp contrast to the minimal reductions in the budget of the District
Attorney).
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ants. 35 The County instituted a system of questionable constitu-
tional3 6 and ethical37 legitimacy by setting up a "Chinese Wall" within
the county Public Defender's Office. 8 Two additional programs oper-
ated by the Office handled conflict of interest cases,39 with the "Wall"
supposedly insulating one group of attorneys from the other groups,
thereby "satisfying" the constitutional concerns. 40
The ethical and constitutional problems presented by Orange
County's reduction of funds for indigent defense were greater than
just conflict of interest issues. The caseload of the Office of the Public
Defender increased by an estimated 6000 (ten percent) in fiscal year
35. See "Conflict Case-Swapping". Alternative Methods of Providing Representation in Conflict
of Interest Cases, THE SPANGENBERG REP. (West Newton, Ma.), Nov. 1998, at 13, 13 (discuss-
ing the restructuring of Orange County's public defender's office as a result of cutbacks);
Jodi Wilgoren, Private Lawyers Left Dry as County Work Evaporates, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 2003625 (noting that "officials have virtually gutted the alternate de-
fense fund, cancelling contracts with [private] lawyers and splitting the public defender's
office in three so that it can handle the conflict cases itself").
36. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-50 (1980) (stating that when a defendant
raises no objection at trial, he must demonstrate than an actual conflict of interest ad-
versely affected his lawyer's performance); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978)
(noting that "whenever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely
objection reversal is automatic" (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942))); Glas-
ser, 315 U.S. at 76 (overturning the conviction of a defendant on the ground of ineffective
assistance of counsel in light of a conflict of interest between the defendant and his co-
defendant, who was also represented by the same attorney), limited on other grounds by
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 178 (1987).
37. See MODEL RuiEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) & cmt. [1] (1998) (pro-
viding that "[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client," and commenting
that "[l]oyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client"); Gary T.
Lowenthal, Joint Representation in Criminal Cases: A Critical Appraisa4 64 VA. L. REv. 939, 950
(1978) (reporting results of author's study that approximately 70% of public defender
offices maintain a strong policy against multiple representation, with 49% of offices having
an outright ban); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal
Op. 1428 (1979) (stating that when a client is represented by an attorney in a legal services
office, "the client employs the legal services as a firm and not a particular lawyer" for pur-
pose of conflict of interest issues).
38. See Lee, supra note 34, at 1913-14 (discussing the County establishment of a system
designed to avoid a conflict of interest).
39. See id. at 1914 (explaining that the Alternate Defender's Office would be assigned a
case where there was a conflict of interest existing with the defendant represented by the
Public Defender Office; if there were a third defendant involved, that case would be as-
signed to the Associate Defender's Office).
40. Id.; see also MODEL CODE OF PROrSSIONAL REsPONsIBILrrV, DR 5-105(D) (1980) (ex-
plaining that restrictions on a lawyer representing conflicting interests apply to any lawyer
or partner associated with him). This rule implies that if the Orange County Chief Public
Defender were to be the head of the three component parts of the Office, then it would be
unethical to have any two lawyers working for him, separated by a wall or not, representing
co-defendants with conflicting interests.
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1995-96, resulting in a caseload of 610 cases for each staff defender.4'
This number is in sharp contrast to the maximum allowable caseload
figure of 150 felony cases per year per attorney that has been adopted
by the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals42 and endorsed by the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association .4 ' The American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Sec-
tion has gone even further, warning, with respect to the numbers set
by the National Advisory Committee, that "[e]mphasis should be
placed on the fact that these guidelines set the maximum conceivable
caseload that an attorney could reasonably manage."'
There was no increase in staff at the Orange County Office of the
Public Defender to handle the additional number of cases.4 5 As a re-
sult, the Office has operated "below the objective reasonable standard
for effectiveness."46 The constitutional right of the client to the effec-
tive assistance of counsel has been denied. This situation also violates
the ethical guidelines promulgated by the American Bar Association's
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility.47 The Commit-
41. See Anna Cekola, Defender's Office Meets Cuts but Seeks Relief, L.A. TIMES, June 24,
1995, available in 1995 WL 2059192; see also Report of the Indigent Defense Organization
Oversight Committee to the Appellate Division First Department for 1997, at 17 (1998)
[hereinafter Indigent Defense Report] (demonstrating that Orange County's shockingly
high caseload was surpassed by the average number of cases-650-assigned to the staff
attorneys of the New York City Legal Aid Society in 1997); cf. Rorie Sherman, Was Unique in
Nation: New Jersey Shuts Down its Advocate, NAT'L L.J., July 20, 1992, at 3, 3 (stating that in
NewJersey, the legislature, in an override of the Governor's veto, sharply cut funds for the
Department of Public Advocate, resulting in a loss of public defenders in that office).
42. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, Standard 13.12, at 160 (allowing for attorneys
handling felonies to handle 150 per year, attorneys handling misdemeanor cases to handle
400 cases per year, counsel working on juvenile matters 200 per year, and lawyers handling
appeals 25 per year); see also Indigent Defense Report, supra note 41, at 14 (explaining that
the Supreme Court department in New York which governed cases prosecuted in Manhat-
tan and the Bronx promulgated a Guideline that no individual attorney should be assigned
more than 150 felony cases or more than 400 misdemeanor cases).
43. See NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING
AND AWARDING GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES (1984) (endors-
ing the 150 figure for felony cases per year, but recommending a maximum of 300, as
opposed to the National Advisory Committee's suggested 400, misdemeanor cases per at-
torney per year). Any determination of a national standard for maximum caseloads is a
difficult one primarily because the policies of the prosecutor, the frequency of plea bar-
gaining, the level and quality of investigative, paralegal, and secretarial assistance, and the
extent of institutional assignments such as arraignments vary from locality to locality.
44. CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 18, at 68 (emphasis added).
45. Lee, supra note 34, at 1916.
46. Id. at 1917.
47. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 347 (1981)
(stating that if the number of lawyers in a legal services office declines, the office "must,
with limited exceptions, decline new legal matters ... only to the extent that the duty of
competent, nonneglectful representation can be fulfilled").
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tee opines that "[a]cceptance of new clients, with a concomitant
greater overload of work, is ethically improper. "48
The ethical and professional failings were not just those of the
Orange County Office. As the Opinion of the ABA Ethics Committee
stated, the legal services lawyer "who attempts to continue responsibil-
ity for substantially more matters than the lawyer can competently
handle thereby violates DR 6-101 (A) (2) and (3)" of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.49 The cited rule provides that a lawyer shall
not "[h]andle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the cir-
cumstances," and shall not "[n]eglect a legal matter entrusted to
him." The very first rule of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct simi-
larly requires a level of competence that a defender who is assigned
610 cases per year is hardly likely to achieve:
Rule 1.1 Competence
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation."
Moreover, Rule 1.16 prohibits an attorney from accepting the assign-
ment of a new case if "the representation will result in violation of the
rules of professional conduct." 1
Hard times for the representation of indigent defendants did not
end, however, once the bad times for states' economies turned
around. It seems to take quite a lot to get a state legislature to say,
"Let's give more money than we did last year to defend poor people
accused of crimes. ''52 Even as states attained budget surpluses in 1995,
indigent defense organizations reported reduced appropriations for
48. Id.; see also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, Standard 5-5.3 (warning
that defender organizations should not "accept workloads that, by reason of their excessive
size, interfere with the rendering of quality representation or lead to the breach of profes-
sional obligations").
49. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 347.
50. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1998).
51. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a)(1) (1998); see also STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE, supra note 4, Standard 5-5.3 (mandating that defense counsel
should not carry "workloads that, by reason of their excessive size, interfere with the ren-
dering of quality representation"); Wisconsin Committee on Professional Ethics, Formal
Opinion E-84-1 1, Sept. 1984 (advising that when an attorney is confronted with a workload
that "makes it impossible to prepare adequately for cases and to represent clients compe-
tently," he should refuse to accept additional cases).
52. See, e.g., Gary Spencer, 18-B Rate Plan Seen Delaying Pay Increases, N.Y.LJ., Jan. 29,
1999, at 1, 1 (reporting that the legislature in New York has failed to provide any increase
in fees paid to court-appointed counsel since 1986).
1442 [VOL. 58:1433
1999] INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 1443
the fiscal year of 1996." In certain localities, continued budget cuts
have created very serious problems. For example, an oversight com-
mittee of the New York State Supreme Court found in 1998 that the
severe reduction in funding has caused the Legal Aid Society in New
York City to "handle too many cases with too little staff' and that "cli-
ents are not receiving the services they deserve."54 The Committee
concluded that either additional funding or reductions of caseloads
were desperately needed.5 The Committee's advice not only went
unheeded, but the Mayor's budget proposal for 1999-2000 called for a
reduction of one million dollars (9.2%) in funding for agencies repre-
senting the indigent.56
There have been some recent innovations in the means for rais-
ing additional funds for indigent defense. User fees require the de-
fendant to pay some fee toward the cost of counsel.57 These fees may
be called "Registration Fees"5 8 or "Application Fees"59 if the defend-
ant must pay money up front before being assigned a public defender
or court-appointed counsel. Other states have regulations providing
for "Recoupment Fees," which require the defendant to pay the fee
upon final disposition of the case.6° Whereas one might expect that
53. See Carroll, supra note 30, at 2 ("Despite the budget surpluses, many indigent de-
fense providers reported that their budget appropriations for FY 1996 were less than they
were in FY 1995.").
54. Indigent Defense Report, supra note 41, at 5; see also id. at 6 (explaining that the
Committee was formed at the request of a number of bar associations to monitor the orga-
nizations that represent indigent defendants in the geographic area covered by the Appel-
late Division, First Department of the New York State Supreme Court, and concluding that
the standards of representation promulgated by the court were not being complied with by
the Legal Aid Society in New York City).
55. Id. at 5-7.
56. Today's News Update, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 1, 1999, at 1, 1.
57. See KLEIN & SPANGENBERG, supra note 25, at 13 (noting that user fees serve to "ob-
tain a portion of the costs of representation from indigent defendants").
58. See id. at 14 (noting that public defender offices in Colorado, Connecticut, Massa-
chusetts, New Jersey, and Washington employ registration fees).
59. See Carroll, supra note 30, at 7-8 (stating that, in 1997, two new states-Kansas and
Tennessee-passed legislation providing for defendants to pay application fees, with Kan-
sas calling its $35 fee an "administrative fee" and imposing it on any defendant receiving
state-paid counsel).
60. KLEIN & SPANGENBERG, supra note 25, at 14. For an example of a recoupment fee
statute, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8(b) (West. Supp. 1998) (providing that whenever a
defendant is provided with a public defender or private counsel appointed by the court,
when the criminal proceedings in the trial court end or the public defender withdraws,
"the court may, after notice and a hearing, make a determination of the present ability of
the defendant to pay all or a portion of the cost thereof'). See also People v. Amor, 523
P.2d 1173, 1175-77 (Cal. 1974) (in bank) (finding that such recoupment statutes are con-
stitutional unless "they arbitrarily discriminate against indigents as a class").
The difficult problem of ascertaining an individual's ability to pay was dealt with in
CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8(g) (2) (West Supp. 1998), which states:
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the money raised will be earmarked for additional, supplemental
funds for indigent defense services, some states simply have put the
money raised back in their general funds.6 1
The small amount of money obtained by these approaches has
not led to any appreciable gains. A special report published at the
end of 1997 by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
concluded that "criminal defense for the poor-an absolute constitu-
tional mandate-has deteriorated markedly in recent years."62 The Presi-
dent of this Association testified before a House of Representatives
Appropriations Committee in 1998 that the lack of adequate funding
for indigent defense "renders a mockery of any Sixth Amendment
right to counsel or Fifth Amendment right to due process."63 In what
may be all too typical a situation, the Public Defender of Baltimore
admitted to the Circuit Court for Baltimore, in 1998, that because of
increases in caseloads, "the attorneys' ability to provide adequate rep-
resentation is seriously challenged."'
It is not only the defense bar that is conscious of the lack of ade-
quate representation provided to the indigent accused. In 1998,
United States Attorney GeneralJanet Renojoined the critics, acknowl-
edging that indeed the "promise of Gideon is not completely fulfilled.
Indigent defendants do not invariably receive effective assistance of
counsel . . .sometimes it is caused by a lack of resources .. .such
failings inevitably erode the community's sense ofjustice and the aspi-
ration of our system to equal justice under the law."6" And a unique
study by the State Bar of Texas, completed in 1998, focused on how
"Ability to pay" means the overall capability of the defendant to reimburse the
costs, or a portion of the costs, of the legal assistance provided to him or her, and
shall include, but not be limited to, all of the following:
(A) The defendant's present financial position.
(B) The defendant's reasonably discernible future financial position ....
(C) The likelihood that the defendant shall be able to obtain employment within
a six-month period from the date of the hearing.
(D) Any other factor or factors which may bear upon the defendant's financial
capability to reimburse the county for the costs of the legal assistance provided to
the defendant.
61. See Carroll, supra note 30, at 7 (discussing the practices of various states).
62. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAwYERS, Low-BID CRIMINAL DEFENSE
CONTRACTING: JUSTICE IN RETREAT, 1, 6 (1997) (emphasis added).
63. National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers News Release, Adequate De-
fender Services Funding Needed to Counter Prosecutorial Excesses, Apr. 1, 1998.
64. Memorandum from Michael N. Gambrill, District Public Defender, Baltimore, Md.,
to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (June 22, 1998) (noting a 20.8% increase in cases at
the Circuit Court level between 1997 and 1998).
65. Janet Reno, Legal Service for the Poor Needs Renewed Vigilance, U.SA. TODAY, Mar. 19,
1998, at 12A; see also US. Attorney General Reno Demonstrates Her Commitment to Indigent Defense
Issues, THE SPANGENBERG REP., supra note 30, at 14 (discussing the efforts of Attorney Gen-
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district attorneys throughout the state viewed indigent defense repre-
sentation." The study found that ninety percent of the prosecutors
believed that lawyers representing the indigent devoted less time to
their clients' cases than did other defense counsel, and sixty-five per-
cent of the D.A.s were of the opinion that indigent defendants re-
ceived a less vigorous defense.67 Because of the obvious familiarity
that prosecutors attain with the failings of indigent defense represen-
tation, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Admin-
istration of Justice recognized, in 1967, the possible impact of
prosecutors advocating changes in the procedures for the appoint-
ment of counsel.'
II. A VERDICT ON STricKLAD FIFTEEN YEARS AFTERWARDS: A
DISASTER OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROPORTIONS
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court was presented with an
opportunity to issue a decision that could have had a substantial im-
pact on the crisis just described.69 Prior to this case, lower courts had
been divided over the standard that should be used to determine
when a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should require the
vacating of a conviction on appeal.71 In Strickland, the Court held
that, in order to have his conviction reversed on Sixth Amendment
eral Reno and other members of the Justice Department to address the issue of funding for
indigent defense).
66. State Bar Completes Survey on the Status of Indigent Defense in Texas: The Prosecutor's
Perspective, THE SPANGENBEG REP. (West Newton, Ma.), June 1998, at 10, 10.
67. Id. at 11.
68. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 147; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 8 (1980) ("A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal
System.").
69. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
70. See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 268 (1973) (finding that "[i]n order to
obtain his release on federal habeas... [the defendant] must... establish that his attor-
ney's advice to plead guilty without having made inquiry into the composition of the grand
jury rendered that advice outside the 'range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases'" (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970))); Johnson v.
United States, 506 F.2d 640, 645, 646 (8th Cir. 1974) (asserting that the standard for assess-
ing ineffective assistance of counsel "is not easily reduced to any formula" and should be
based on a "professional standard" that "tests for the degree of competence prevailing
among those licensed to practice at the bar"); United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379
(2d Cir. 1949) (stating that the lack of effective assistance must shock the conscience of the
court and cause the proceedings to be a "farce and a mockery" of justice in order to war-
rant relief); see also Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that,
by 1962, "nine of the eleven circuits were applying the... 'farce and mockery'" standard,
and that, after some fluctuations, "[s]ince 1970, every circuit except [the Second] has
adopted a 'reasonably competent assistance' standard, in one of its many formulations"
(citations omitted)).
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grounds, a defendant must show that his counsel's performance was
not effective, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct, and that the
errors committed were prejudicial to the defendant.7" Had the Court
set a more stringent requirement for the performance of counsel that
was similar, for example, to the recommendations of the American
Bar Association,72 governments would have had to dedicate substan-
tially more funds to the defense of the indigent. The Court, however,
refused to adhere to the ABA Criminal Justice Standards 3 which, as
the Introduction to the Standards states, reflect "the profound
changes in interpretation of the constitutional right to counsel," and
which "should serve as a useful tool to both the policy-maker and the
litigator who seeks legal and ethical guidance on the provision of de-
fense services in state and federal courts."74 Instead, the Strickland
Court interpreted the requirements of the Sixth Amendment's right to
effective assistance of counsel75 in such an ultimately meaningless
manner as to require little more than a warm body with a law degree
standing next to the defendant.76
71. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-92.
72. See STANDARDS FOR CIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at ix, xii (discussing the history
of the articulation and adoption of the Standards, and their revision in light of a number
of changes, including "growth in public defender caseloads"). These Standards are
respected because they are:
the result of careful drafting and review by representatives of all segments of the
criminal justice system-judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, court personnel
and academics active in criminal justice teaching and research. Circulation of the
standards to a wide range of outside expertise guaranteed a rich array of com-
ment and criticism which has greatly strengthened the final product.
Id. at ix.
73. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (referring to the Standards as "guides to determining
what is reasonable, but .. .only guides"). The Court attempted to explain its decision
without giving more weight to the ABA Standards: "Indeed, the existence of detailed
guidelines for representation could distract counsel from the overriding mission of vigor-
ous advocacy of the defendant's cause." Id. at 689. No explanation or elaboration of this
most puzzling and disturbing comment is provided. Would informing counsel of the need
to communicate with his client, or to contact appropriate witnesses, somehow affect nega-
tively his vigorous advocacy?
74. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, at xii; see United States v. Decoster,
624 F.2d 196, 276-78 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (giving great
weight to the standards).
75. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-96 (holding that, in order to show constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish that his counsel's performance
was unreasonably deficient according to prevailing professional norms, and that the per-
formance was prejudicial in the sense that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different").
76. The Supreme Court, over 40 years earlier, had warned against exactly this possibil-
ity. See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (noting that inadequate assistance
"could convert the appointment of counsel into a sham and nothing more than a formal
compliance with the Constitution's requirement that an accused be given the assistance of
1446
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Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's recent denial of a
hearing to a defendant sentenced to death whose trial attorney, ac-
cording to court observers, "seems to have slept his way through virtu-
ally the entire trial."77 (The "entire" trial was not that long. Opening
statements took place on August 10; the jury returned its guilty verdict
August 12; and on August 14, the defendant was sentenced to
death) .78 As the Houston newspaper covering the trial wrote of the
defense attorney: "His mouth kept falling open and his head lolled
back on his shoulders, and then he awakened just long enough to
catch himself and sit upright. Then it happened again. And again.
And again. Every time he opened his eyes, a different prosecution
witness was on the stand .... . When the journalist inquired of the
lawyer why he had fallen asleep repeatedly, the "counsel" explained:
"It's boring."8 ° One wonders if three other attorneys who slept during
significant parts of the trials of their clients-who all also received the
death penalty-would have responded similarly." The Texas Court
of Appeals turned down the appeals in all three of these cases, as it
had in the case of Carl Johnson who was executed in 1996 even
counsel," and concluding that "[t] he Constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel can-
not be satisfied by mere formal appointment" (emphasis added)); see also Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 743 (1967) (noting that, under the Sixth Amendment, the defendant has the
right to have "counsel acting in the role of an advocate"). Despite whatever right the de-
fendant may have legally, the reality may become like the indigent defense representation
described in New York City: "What passes for 'representation' in this system is the pres-
ence of a body, any body, next to the defendant. It is not simply a question of incompe-
tence, though that exists. It is not a question of poor quality or ineffective representation.
In operational and structural terms, it is a system of non-representation under which the
defendant is disoriented and the judge may eventually lose patience and relieve the attor-
ney (especially so with Legal Aid)." DtAFr REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE IN CRIMINAL ADVO-
CACY OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN
NEw YoRK Cir. AN EVALUATION 333 (1985). Not all attorneys who provide the warm body
believe that defendants benefit at all from their presence. Take the trial counsel in Cooper
v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1977), modified, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978), for
instance. Counsel had had a caseload while working at the Public Defenders Office of
approximately 2000 cases per year and resigned from the office upon reaching the conclu-
sion that she was "actually doing the defendants more harm by just presenting a live body
than if they had no representation at all." Id. at 1163 n.1 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
77. Bruce Shapiro, Sleeping Lawyer Syndrome, THE NATION, Apr. 7, 1997, available in 1997
WL 8866360; see also McFarland v. Texas, 519 U.S. 1119 (1997) (mem.) (denying review of
McFarland's capital conviction).
78. Shapiro, supra note 77.
79. See id. (reporting the Houston Chronicle's story about the trial).
80. Id. (reporting that the lawyer added that he customarily takes "a short nap in the
afternoon").
81. See id. (noting that over a one year period, "the Texas Court of Appeals has turned
down three petitions from death-row inmates whose lawyers slept through significant parts
of their trials").
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though his counsel was also reported to have slept during jury selec-
tion and portions of the testimony as well.82 The Texas courts' appli-
cation of Strickland has had a significant impact on capital cases in this
country. From 1976, when the Court in Gregg v. Georgia13 lifted the
death penalty prohibition which had been announced by the
Supreme Court in the 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia, 4 to 1994, ap-
proximately one third of all those executed in this country were put to
death in Texas.85
Texas is not the only state to hold that the constitutional require-
ment of effective assistance can be met by a sleeping lawyer. In People
v. Tippins,"6 the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme
Court recognized that "a defense counsel's sleeping during the course
of a trial is reprehensible," but, applying the traditional Strickland anal-
ysis, upheld the conviction anyway."' And if a lawyer is awake, there is
no requirement that he be sober. In People v. Garrison,"8 a California
case where the defendant was sentenced to death, the defense attor-
ney not only "consumed large amounts of alcohol each day of the
trial," but on the second day ofjury selection "was arrested for driving
to the courthouse with a .27 blood-alcohol content." 9 The trial judge
attempted to reassure the defendant: "I personally can assure you
that you probably have one of the finest defense counsel in this
county."9 ° The hearing on the defendant's habeas corpus petition
claiming ineffective assistance before the California Supreme Court,
sitting in bank, included expert witness testimony that a chronic alco-
holic such as the defense counsel (who had by that time died of the
disease) is often unable properly to make judgment calls and to think
through problems.91 Nonetheless, the court, relying on Strickland, de-
nied this claim of the defendant.92
82. Id.
83. 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion) (finding no per se constitutional pro-
hibition against the death penalty).
84. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
85. See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1262 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
86. 570 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1991).
87. Id. at 582-83.
88. 765 P.2d 419 (Cal. 1989) (in bank).
89. See id. at 440 (noting further that the lawyer "drank in the morning, during court
recesses, and throughout the evening" and that the bailiff testified that the lawyer "always
smelled of alcohol").
90. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id. at 441.
92. Id. The court did set aside some parts of the judgment and reversed the death
sentence. Id. at 446.
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Strickland also apparently permits a lawyer to be appointed on the
morning of a trial that finishs the same day with a guilty verdict fol-
lowed immediately by a sentence of life imprisonment. The Fifth Cir-
cuit, in Avery v. Procunier,t concluded that: "A review of the state trial
record does not disclose any failing of defense counsel of constitu-
tional proportions.... The performance of counsel met the standard
as elucidated in Strickland v. Washington."94 This decision, like so
many other post-Strickland cases, indicates that minimally effective
assistance hardly requires that defense counsel actively challenge the
prosecution's case. After all, the prosecutor's case in Avery was
"straightforward," and an eyewitness made an "unqualified identifica-
tion of [the defendant] in court."95 But most experienced, compe-
tent defense attorneys will acknowledge that eyewitness testimony is
one of the weakest forms of evidence and is certainly susceptible to
aggressive and often persuasive attack. It is all the more troubling that
the Fifth Circuit relied on in-court identification: Who else but the
accused is going to be sitting next to the defense attorney?
Or consider the recent case of State v. Wille.9 6 The defendant,
who was sentenced to death upon a conviction for murder, was repre-
sented by an attorney who had been convicted of a felony and sen-
tenced to a three year suspended period of incarceration and 416
hours of community service." Because Louisiana at this time was hav-
ing difficulty finding lawyers to represent indigents in capital cases,
the convicted-felon-attorney was ordered to fulfill his community ser-
vice by representing Mr. Wille.98 There was no evidence that the at-
torney had ever tried a capital case before,99 and he had expressed no
93. 750 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1985).
94. Id. at 447 (citation omitted).
95. Id.
96. 595 So. 2d 1149 (La. 1992).
97. Id. at 1151. Counsel's conviction was for conspiring to defraud an agency of the
United States. Id.; cf. Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302, 303-06 (2d Cir. 1992) (in banc)
(finding no ineffective assistance of counsel in the case of a lawyer under investigation by a
disciplinary committee who argued to the committee that he was mentally incompetent to
prepare for his disciplinary hearing, but who was nonetheless permitted to represent a
criminal defendant, who was unaware of his lawyer's mental difficulties until the defendant
was informed of the lawyer's suspension from law practice at his sentencing for murder).
98. Wille, 595 So. 2d at 1151.
99. There is widespread acceptance of the need for lawyers in capital cases to receive
special training. See, e.g., ABA TASK FORCE ON DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORUS, TOWARD A
MORE JUST AND EFFEcrrvE SYSTEM OF REVIEW IN STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES B-2 (1990)
(calling upon states to set strict standards for the appointment of counsel in capital cases to
ensure that only qualified, experienced, and competent counsel receive assignment); Fatal
Defense: Firsthand Accounts of Capital Justice, NAT'L LJ., June 11, 1990, available in Westlaw,
6/11/90 Nat'l LJ. 40 (noting the near unanimity among lawyers interviewed in six states
that specialized instruction for capital representation is needed); Stephanie Saul, When
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willingness to take on this case.100 The defendant was never informed
by either his attorney or the court of the facts surrounding his coun-
sel's appointment.10 ' Even more significantly, perhaps, his counsel
had been a former state senator whose indictment and sentence had
received "substantial publicity" in the local area of Louisiana where
Wille was tried.0 2
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the jurors' knowledge of
his counsel's notoriety may have affected their view of the defense,
thereby depriving defendant of his right to an unbiased jury. °5 Coun-
sel had never asked the potential jurors on voir dire whether they had
known of his conviction, because, the defendant maintained, counsel
was embarrassed to publicize that information and question jurors
about it.'0 4 The defendant claimed that his counsel had had a con-
flict of interest that prevented him from being dedicated solely to his
client's interests at the critical stage ofjury selection.105 The Supreme
Court of Louisiana rejected the defendant's appeal of his death sen-
tence, apparently accepting counsel's statement that he "did his best"
in representing his client.10 6
The Supreme Court of Louisiana could not, however, dismiss too
quickly the conflict of interest issue. Counsel admitted at the post-
trial hearing that, "[H] e sees the conflict as he looks back. He was not
conscious of suppressing any information about his conviction, but
that may have been what he was doing." 7 The court had to acknowl-
edge, therefore, that counsel "should have asked the prospective jurors
about their knowledge and attitude toward him because if they had
something against him it would hurt the defendant."'°8 One might
think, therefore, that the court would overturn the conviction (or at
Death is the Penalty: Attorneys for Poor Defendants Often Lack Experience and Skill NEW YoRK
NEWSDAY, Nov. 25, 1991, at 8 (discussing the unique law that governs all aspects of capital
cases-from jury selection to the penalty phase to appeal-and noting that, in those states
where the standards for appointment of counsel in capital cases are minimal or nonexis-
tent, the entire trial will typically last for only two or three days).
100. See Wie, 595 So. 2d at 1152 (noting that the attorney "did not want to accept the
appointment, but the judge insisted"); see also Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1522 (11th
Cir. 1985) (involving a lawyer who declared: "I despise [the appointment], I'd rather take
a whipping.").
101. Wille, 595 So. 2d at 1152 (noting that the defendant maintained that his attorney's
failure to disclose deprived the defendant of his right to object to the appointment).
102. Id. at 1151.
103. Id. at 1152.
104. Id. at 1151.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1152.
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id. (emphasis added).
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least the death sentence). Astonishingly, however, the court con-
cluded that counsel's "hindsight reflections on what he should have
done and what might have been subconsciously motivating him dur-
ing voir dire, although certainly made in good faith, have little relevance
to a consideration of whether an actual conflict of interest existed dur-
ing trial."' 9 Under the prejudice prong of Strickland, the court af-
firmed the defendant's death sentence.
The Louisiana Supreme Court's opinion is most peculiar in one
additional respect. In a previous review of the defendant's appeal, l10
the court conditionally affirmed defendant's conviction, but re-
manded his case for an evidentiary hearing on the conflict of interest
issue. The hearing was held before the same judge who had ap-
pointed the counsel to represent the defendant.111 That judge had
also been the trial judge and, at the subsequent hearing over which he
presided to determine conflict of interest, testified about the circum-
stances that led to his appointment of the counsel.1 12 Louisiana had a
statute, modeled after Federal Rule of Evidence 605,113 that prohibits
a judge from testifying as a witness at the proceeding over which he
presides. 4 The court confirmed the judge's finding that the very
counsel whom he had appointed had no conflict of interest and was
effective because, in accordance with Strickland, the defendant was not
prejudiced.115 The court did note, however, that "it was error for the
judge to testify at the evidentiary hearing over which he presided."1 16
Thus, it appears that when confronted with a violation of the law, a
court must at least acknowledge that fact, but it certainly does not
mean the defendant's death sentence will not stand.
Strickland v. Washington has led to the holdings described above
because of the two-prong test that the Supreme Court required a de-
fendant to satisfy before a reviewing court will overturn the conviction
based on ineffective assistance. The defendant must show (1) that
109. Id. at 1153 (emphasis added).
110. State v. Wille, 559 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1990), affd, 595 So. 2d 1149 (La. 1992).
111. Wille, 595 So. 2d at 1154-55. The judge was, somehow, objectively and impartially to
decide whether his own choice to appoint the defendant's counsel was inappropriate.
112. Id. at 1155.
113. FED. R. EVID. 605 ("The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a
witness. No objection need be made in order to preserve the point.").
114. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 605 (West 1995) ("The judge presiding at the trial may
not testify in that trial as a witness. No objection need be made in order to preserve the
point.").
115. Wile, 595 So. 2d at 1153-54.
116. Id. at 1155. The court declared that "if a judge is to take the stand as a witness,
regardless of the nature or materiality of his testimony, he should be recused from presid-
ing at the trial or hearing." Id. at 1156.
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counsel's performance was deficient 1 7 and (2) that "there is a reason-
able probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the re-
sult of the proceeding would have been different." 8 As to the first
prong, the Strickland Court ruled that there was to be a strong pre-
sumption that the representation provided by the attorney was consti-
tutionally adequate.119  Not only was there to be the strong
presumption of effectiveness, but judicial review of counsel's repre-
sentation was to be "highly deferential"120
In light of the widespread acknowledgment of the existence of a
crisis in the quality of representation provided to indigent defendants,
the presumption in favor of counsel's effectiveness is somewhat hard
to fathom, especially when the Court emphasizes that "It]he proper
measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms."1 2 ' If the norms are that coun-
sel, due to overwhelming caseloads, typically fail to do much of what
ought to be done to provide a competent and effective defense, then
in any given case involving such failings, that counsel's work would not
be deemed deficient. Is this all that the Sixth Amendment now stands
for?
Perhaps. In Lockhart v. FretweU, the Supreme Court recently per-
mitted a death sentence to stand even though it acknowledged that
counsel's error was responsible for the defendant receiving the death
penalty instead of a sentence of life imprisonment.12 2 The counsel in
this case failed, during the sentencing procedure in state court, to
raise the claim that a sentence of death would have been unconstitu-
tional under the Eighth Circuit rule established in Collins v. Lock-
hart. 1 3 Collins held that the sentencing court could not consider as an
aggravating factor one that duplicates an element of the crime that
117. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring a "showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaran-
teed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment").
118. Id. at 694.
119. See id. at 690-91 (stating that reviewing courts "should recognize that counsel is
strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions
in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment"). But see id. at 713 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (observing that "'strongly presuming' that [defense counsel's] behavior will fall
within the zone of reasonableness, is covertly to legitimate convictions and sentences ob-
tained on the basis of incompetent conduct by defense counsel").
120. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (emphasis added); see also Klein, supra note 5, at 640-41
(arguing that this view of assessing the adequacy of an attorney's performance differs from
that of evaluating the work of other professionals).
121. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
122. 506 U.S. 364, 371 (1993).
123. 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1985), overruled by Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384, 1393
(8th Cir. 1989).
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was committed, because such "double counting" would not genuinely
narrow the group of persons eligible for the death penalty.1 24 The
statute that Collins found unconstitutional was the very statute under
which defendant Fretwell was in fact sentenced. 125 Upon review, the
United States District Court held that Fretwell's counsel "had a duty to
be aware of all law relevant to death penalty cases" 126 and that coun-
sel's failure to object to the submission to the jury of a "duplicative"
aggravating factor constituted prejudice under Strickland v. Washing-
ton.1 27 Thus, the District Court granted the habeas corpus relief and
vacated the defendant's death sentence. 28
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the District
Court, emphasizing that had counsel known the law and provided ef-
fective assistance, the defendant would not have received the death
sentence. 129 The Supreme Court, however, held that the Eighth Cir-
cuit's ruling would grant the defendant "a windfall to which the law
does not entitle him."'o The Court focused on the fact that since the
time of the sentencing the Eighth Circuit had overruled its Collins v.
Lockhart holding and that "double counting" was to be permitted.'3 1
But the Eighth Circuit decision to which the Supreme Court re-
ferred-Perry v. Lockhart' 32 -had occurred after the sentencing phase
of the defendant's trial; the Court reached this result despite the
Eighth Circuit's holding that, at the time the defendant was sentenced,
"double counting" was prohibited, and that the sentence of death was
impermissible because it was invalid at the time it was imposed. 133
In dissent, Justice Stevens called the decision of the majority
"astonishing," and added that the "Court's aversion to windfalls seems
to disappear, however, when the State is the favored recipient."1 34
124. Id. at 263-65.
125. Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 367-68.
126. Fretwell v. Lockhart, 739 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (E.D. Ark. 1990), aftd, 946 F.2d 571
(8th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
127. Id. at 1337-38.
128. Id. at 1338.
129. See Fretwell, 946 F.2d at 577 (noting that "fundamental unfairness exists when a
prisoner receives a death sentence rather than life imprisonment solely because of his
attorney's error").
130. Fretwel4 506 U.S. at 370 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984)).
131. See id. at 371 (noting that "[h]ad the trial court chosen to follow Collins, counsel's
error would have 'deprived [defendant Fretwell] of the chance to have the state court
make an error in his favor'" (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiaeat 10, Fretwel
506 U.S. 364 (No. 91-1393))).
132. 871 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1989).
133. See Fretwel, 946 F.2d at 578 (concluding that Fretwell "was sentenced while Collins
was good law, and was entitled to its benefits at the time of his sentencing").
134. FretweL 506 U.S. at 376 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Characterizing the Court's reasoning as "unconvincing and unjust,"135
Justice Stevens wrote that: "The fact that counsel's performance con-
stituted an abject failure to address the most important legal question
at issue in his client's death penalty hearing gives rise, without more,
to a powerful presumption of breakdown in the entire adversarial
system."
13 6
A fascinating postscript to the Fretwell case occurred in early 1999.
Eleven days before Bobby Ray Fretwell was scheduled to die, the Gov-
ernor of Arkansas, a strong supporter of the death penalty, commuted
Fretwell's sentence. 137 Ajuror in the trial, which had taken place fif-
teen years earlier, called for mercy for Fretwell and claimed that he
had voted for the death sentence only because he was fearful that
otherwise he would be ostracized in the hometown that he had shared
with the deceased.1 8 The juror did what the Supreme Court had re-
fused to do-sharply criticize the quality of the defense: "The only
thing I remember is that the lawyer asked [the defendant Fretwell]
about his childhood, and he said, 'It was pretty bad' and that was
it."139 The Governor stated that it was the juror's comments about
defense counsel that led him to commute the sentence.
140
Another problem with Strickland's "reasonableness under prevail-
ing professional norms" standard is that the lawyers who routinely rep-
resent indigent defendants may not be among the nation's best and
brightest.' The fees paid appointed counsel are so low that exper-
ienced lawyers who have been able to build their own practice will
commonly stop taking assigned cases. The burnout rate in public de-
fender offices due to the overwhelming caseloads causes many exper-
ienced defenders to leave. And the federal judiciary knows this. The
Federal Judicial Center conducted a survey and issued a report which
135. Id. at 377; see also id. at 386-87 (adding that "the court's decision makes a startling
and most unwise departure from our commitment to a system that ensures fairness and
reliability by subjecting the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing").
136. Id. at 386. See generally Bright, supra note 22, at 1864 (arguing that it is particularly
inappropriate to use the prejudice standard at the penalty phase of a capital case).
137. See Steve Barnes, Death Row Inmate Spared After Juror Makes Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,
1999, at A12 (reporting that Governor Huckabee is a Republican and former Baptist minis-
ter who had not granted clemency to any other individual who had been scheduled to die
since he had become Governor in 1996, and that he had stated while announcing the
commutation that "I had rather face the anger of the people than the wrath of God").
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Irving R Kaufman, Attorney Incompetence: A Plea for Reform, 69 A.B.A. J. 308, 308
(1983) (concluding, from 21 years experience on the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, that court-appointed private counsel who represent indigent defendants are the
most incompetent of defense attorneys).
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concluded that 41.3% of the federal judges responding believed there
to be a "serious problem of inadequate trial advocacy in their
courts.' 1 42 When Warren Burger was Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, he reflected on the numerous discussions he had had with fed-
eral district court judges regarding incompetent representation of in-
digent defendants and concluded that from one-third to one-half of
counsel in serious criminal cases are "not really qualified to render
fully adequate representation. ' ' 43 Burger added that Americans are
"more casual about qualifying the people we allow to act as advocates
in the courtrooms than we are about licensing our electricians."1 44
Nowhere perhaps is the norm lower than among the lawyers who
try cases in which the death penalty may be imposed. Justice Black-
mun, shortly before resigning from the Supreme Court, took the op-
portunity to "address the crisis in trial and state postconviction legal
representation for capital defendants."1 45 He noted that "the attor-
neys assigned to represent indigent capital defendants at times are less
qualified than those appointed in ordinary criminal cases."14 6 Black-
mun presented two primary reasons for the lack of qualification: (1)
the absence of any standards, and (2) the fact that the compensation
for lawyers in capital cases is "perversely lOW." 1 47 As Blackmun ob-
served, "The prospect that hours spent in trial preparation... will be
uncompensated unquestionably chills even a qualified attorney's zeal-
ous representation of his client." 4 ' It was this same concern about
the lack of available resources and the resulting incompetency of
142. See Roger C. Cramton & Erik M. Jensen, The State of Trial Advocacy and Legal Educa-
tion: Three New Studies, 30J. LEGAL EDUC. 253, 256 (1979) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (citing A. Partridge & G. Bermant, THE QUALITY OF ADVOCACY IN FEDERAL COURTS 16
(1978)).
143. Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certifica-
tion of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FoRDHAM L. REv. 227, 234 (1973); see
also PAUL B. WICE, CHAOS IN THE COURTHOUSE: THE INNER WORKINGS OF THE URBAN CRIMI-
NAL COURTS 88 (1985) (noting that "judges were generally very negative in their evaluation
of the competence of private criminal lawyers").
144. Burger, supra note 143, at 230. But see Marvin E. Frankel, Curing Lawyers' Incompe-
tence: Primum Non Nocere, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 613, 616 (1977) (presenting an alternative
view that the problem in representation is not a lack of skill or training, but of "sloth,
dishonesty, indifference, and seeming psychopathology").
145. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1256 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from de-
nial of certiorari).
146. Id. at 1257 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
147. Id.; see also In re Berger, 498 U.S. 233, 235-36 (1991) (per curiam) (concluding that
the maximum fees permitted by statute to be paid to attorneys representing capital defend-
ants before the Supreme Court may "deter otherwise willing and qualified attorneys from
offering their services to represent indigent capital defendants").
148. McFarland, 512 U.S. at 1258 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see
also Bright, supra note 22, at 1883 (arguing that "[n]o poor person accused of any crime
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counsel in capital cases that led the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association in 1997 to call for the abolition of the death penalty. 4 '
Another portion of the Strickland decision, viewed with the bene-
fit of hindsight, has had disastrous consequences. The Supreme
Court in Strickland informed courts which in the future might be re-
viewing ineffectiveness claims that "the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
'might be considered sound trial strategy.'"'50 To emphasize its point,
the Court added, "There are countless ways to provide effective assist-
ance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys
would not defend a particular client in the same way." 5' If, after all,
there are countless ways to represent a defendant, how can one attor-
ney's approach be faulted?
For some courts, the response seems to be, "it can't."' 5 2 In 1994,
the New York Court of Appeals, refusing to find ineffectiveness, la-
beled as a tactical decision a counsel's failure to make a post-trial mo-
tion that surely would have led the trial court to set aside the
conviction." 3 The prosecutor in the case had failed to comply with
the requirement of New York's criminal procedure law to provide de-
fense counsel with all statements made by a witness before he or she
testifies.' 54 The court, in finding that the counsel's decision did not
constitute ineffectiveness, reasoned that setting aside the conviction
would only have accomplished delay because the defendant would
have been likely to be convicted at the retrial. "Defense counsel could
have reasonably considered that his client's interest would best be
served by no further delay in the resolution of the case against the
should receive the sort of representation that is found acceptable in the criminal courts of
this nation today").
149. NLADA Board of Directors'Resolution Calls for End to Death Penalty, THE SPANGENBERG
REP. (West Newton, Ma.), Dec. 1998, at 5, 5. The Defender Association had, years earlier,
enacted Standards for Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.
Id.
150. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (quoting Michel v. Louisiana,
350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
151. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance
of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 343 (1983)).
152. See Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials,
107 HARv. L. REv. 1923, 1931 n.87 (1994) (stating that in the years 1991, 1992, and 1993,
the reliance by Texas courts on characterizing as "strategy" that which might be error was a
major factor in the rejection of nearly 407 of the Strickland claims filed by death row
inmates).
153. People v. Flores, 639 N.E.2d 19, 20-21 (N.Y. 1994).
154. See id. at 20 (discussing the requirement of People v. Rosario, 173 N.E.2d 881 (N.Y.
1961), that defense counsel personally examine a document to determine for himself
whether it may be helpful for the purpose of cross-examining a witness).
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client."155 The dissenting judge responded critically to the labeling of
counsel's failure as a strategic decision: "Delivering up one's client
for incarceration sooner rather than later-with no concrete advan-
tage discernible-obviously does not fall within that category."156
Even more significantly, this judge revealed his exasperation with the
highest court of New York's repeated characterizations of the failings
of defense counsel as "tactical" or "strategic": "Although we may have
gone a long way in the direction of tolerating apparent professional
blunders in the name of 'trial strategy,' even that doctrine must have
some limits."
157
Odd, as well, is the decision of the court in People v. Wise.'58 The
defense counsel, in the presence of the jury, announced that he was
refusing to continue with the trial, berated the judge in a manner that
the appellate court characterized as "improper and unprofessional,"
and departed from the courtroom. 159 The appellate court, refusing to
vacate the resulting conviction on defendant's claim that he was de-
nied effective assistance, proceeded to label counsel's conduct as "part
of a tactic intended to force the court to declare a mistrial."160 More-
over, if the concept of treating an error or a lack of professionalism as
a strategic decision is not a sufficient excuse for a court that does not
wish to find incompetence of counsel, courts place the burden on the
defendant to prove "the absence of strategic or other legitimate expla-
nations for counsel's failure."1 6 '
Consider also the case of Kenneth Earl Gay, convicted of first de-
gree murder of a police officer and sentenced by the jury to death.'6 2
Even though the Supreme Court of California determined in 1998
that Gay's lawyer was incompetent because he had failed to adequately
investigate potentially mitigating evidence for the penalty phase and
155. Id. at 21. The court did note that, when the lawyer did review the withheld material
after the verdict, he stated on the record that it would have made no difference to the way
in which he conducted the trial. Id. at 20.
156. Id. at 23 (Titone, J., dissenting).
157. Id. (emphasis added); see also Fatal Defense- Effective Assistance: Just A Nominal
Right?, NAT'L LJ., June 11, 1990, available in Westlaw, 6190 Nat'l L.J. 42 (reporting that the
former President of the Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers described the
Strickland message to appellate courts as follows: "We direct you to pretend everything was
done for tactical reasons.").
158. 409 N.Y.S.2d 877 (App. Div. 1978).
159. Id. at 878, 880.
160. Id. at 880.
161. People v. De Pillo, 565 N.Y.S.2d 650, 651 (App. Div. 1990) (emphasis added).
Counsel in De Pillo had failed to file a written motion to dismiss the indictment, which
would have been granted, based on the claim that the statute of limitations had expired.
Id. at 650.
162. In re Gay, 968 P.2d 476, 478 (Cal. 1998).
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because he failed to interview or prepare the witnesses that he did
present,163 the conviction stood. 64 The court did not consider it im-
portant that prior to trial, the defendant's counsel had advised Gay to
admit his complicity in several robberies, falsely assuring him that his
confession would be inadmissible at trial.'65 In addition, the counsel
was subsequently disbarred for misappropriating another client's
funds.166 The court's decision not to reverse the judgment of convic-
tion allowed the previous judgment of the appellate court to stand; in
this case, the Supreme Court of California has determined that
"[b]ecause the record is inadequate to enable us to state that Gay's
counsel had no tactical reason for the manner in which this aspect of
the defense was conducted, the judgment must be affirmed."'67
How can a defendant prove a negative?" 6 How can one success-
fully convince a court what the motive of the lawyer was not? For ex-
ample, how could the defendant in People v. Jones169 have rebutted the
court's finding that his lawyer's failure to make a valid pretrial motion
to suppress incriminating statements was not ineffective because the
failure "may have been part of counsel's trial strategy"?70 Three
Supreme Court Justices, perceiving the characterization of "error" as
"strategy" to be an abuse, dissented from a denial of certiorari in
Mitchell v. Kemp, a death penalty case. 1 7 1 Justice Marshall responded
to the majority's decision: "[A] failure to investigate the merit of ac-
cepted and persuasive defenses[ ] cannot be characterized as 'sound
trial strategy. '172
163. Id. at 509.
164. The court did conclude, however, that Gay had received constitutionally inade-
quate representation at the penalty phase, granted habeas relief on this issue, and re-
manded the case for a new penalty trial. Id.
165. Id. at 480.
166. Id. at 479 n.5; see id. at 513-14 (Werdegar,J., concurring) (explaining that counsel,
having to repay a former client whose funds he had misappropriated, engineered his as-
signment by the court in Gay's case in order to quickly obtain compensation, and that the
lawyer spent little time or effort on the case).
167. People v. Cummings, 850 P.2d 1, 71 (Cal. 1993) (in bank).
168. See People v. Nix, 569 N.Y.S.2d 677, 678 (App. Div. 1991) (refusing to find ineffec-
tiveness because the defendant had not "proved the absence of a strategic or other legitimate
explanation for counsel's failure to make a pretrial motion to suppress his statements to
the police" (emphasis added)).
169. 480 N.Y.S.2d 601 (App. Div. 1984).
170. Id. at 602; see also People v. Duvall, 593 N.Y.S.2d 712, 712 (App. Div. 1993) (indicat-
ing that in order to show ineffective assistance, defendant "must demonstrate that there
was no legitimate explanation for counsel's failure to make the motion" (citing People v.
Garcia, 555 N.E.2d 902 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Rivera, 525 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1988))).
171. 483 U.S. 1026 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (joined byJustices
Brennan and Blackmun).
172. Id. at 1030 (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
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Can't every decision that an attorney makes be characterized as
part of the lawyer's strategy? If a lawyer fails to interview and call wit-
nesses for the defense, how can it be shown that this lack of prepara-
tion was not strategic, e.g., because counsel may have believed that the
witnesses would not be found credible? A poor strategic choice based
on bad judgment is incompetence, especially when counsel's decision
was based on inadequate knowledge of the facts due to the counsel's
failure to conduct the needed investigation. And if an attorney de-
cides on a course of action because of an inadequate understanding
of the law applicable to the charge against the defendant, this deci-
sion also is ineffectiveness, despite Strickland's claim that "the court
should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of
reasonable professional judgment." 7 '
In Strickland's discussion of how appellate courts should assess
strategic choices, the indigent defendant fares poorly. The Court
indicates that the appellate court considering the claim of ineffective-
ness should expect-and require-less from counsel for the indi-
gent.174 The Court asserts that " [1] imitations of time and money" may
affect strategic decisions, and that these choices "are owed defer-
ence."175 Not only do public defenders, to the dismay of professionals
evaluating the quality of assistance provided, 176 have less time and
money to devote to their clients' representation, but, upon becoming
experienced, defenders tend to leave this office, and experienced pri-
vate counsel tend not to take court assignments because of the outra-
geously low pay. 1 7 7 Therefore, when the Strickland Court states that
"[a] mong the factors relevant to deciding whether particular strategic
choices are reasonable are the experience of the attorney, "178 the Court
once again is instructing appellate courts to expect and require less
from counsel for the indigent.
179
Concern about the impact of Strickland existed on the Supreme
Court bench itself within a few years after the decision. In a case just
173. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (emphasis added).
174. See id. at 681 (explaining that deference is owed to strategic decisions that are made
as a result of financial limitations).
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 11-68 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 147-148 and accompanying text.
178. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681 (emphasis added).
179. The lower courts took this advice. See, e.g., Kimball v. State, 490 A.2d 653, 657 (Me.
1985) (acknowledging the need for counsel to conduct an investigation, but implying that
this obligation must be considered in light of the fact that "[tirial counsel ha[s] a limited
budget for investigation").
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noted,' Mitchell v. Kemp, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan
and Blackmun, wrote that, "Since Strickland was decided, the Court
has never identified an instance of attorney dereliction that met its
stringent standard."18 ' Justice Marshall concluded that "the Court
should now give life to the Strickland standard."182 This case that
prompted the dismay of three Justices was yet another one in which
the Supreme Court denied certiorari, despite the conclusion of these
three Justices that counsel had neither pursued a vigorous defense
nor prepared adequately for the penalty phase of the capital case."a
Counsel admitted that he did not interview the police officer who
claimed to have witnessed the defendant's confession, 184 nor the sole
witness to the crime itself."8 5 The attorney filed no pretrial
motions. 1
86
The dissenters severely criticized counsel's failure to present miti-
gating evidence in the punishment phase of the case. The affidavits of
those who would have testified on the defendant's behalf consisted of
170 pages and included supportive statements from a former prosecu-
tor, a bank Vice-President, a city councilman, and several teachers.18 7
The Justices' sharp criticism of the overall lack of representation pro-
vided by defense counsel implicitly extended to the other Supreme
Court Justices' use of Strickland to deny review of the conviction and
death sentence:
As a result of counsel's nonfeasance, no one argued to the
sentencing judge that petitioner should not die.... Preju-
dice to the petitioner's case is obvious when not even a sug-
gestion that his life had some value, that his crime was
aberrational, or that he was suffering from severe depression
reached the ears and the conscience of the sentencing judge.
The judge heard not even a plea for mercy.'88
A recent case from Texas illustrates yet another weakness of Strick-
land. In Maestas v. State,189 the court accepted Stricklands mandate
180. See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
181. See 483 U.S. 1026, 1026 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1029-31.
184. See id. at 1027 (noting that the confession formed the basis for establishing certain
aggravating circumstances in support of the death sentence). The attorney's reason for
not speaking to the officer was that, "I personally don't like the man." Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1031 (citation omitted).
189. 963 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. App. 1998, pet. granted), affd, 987 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Crim.
App.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 93 (1999).
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that a reviewing court assess the totality of counsel's performance and
not just one instance of a failing by counsel.1 9 ° Thus, although the
Maestas court cited and accepted numerous errors of counsel, the
court failed to find ineffectiveness because "the trial as a whole must
be reviewed and not isolated incidents of counsel's performance."191
Similarly, in People v. De Pillo,192 the court conceded that defense
counsel failed to file a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment for
being filed more than two years after the commission of the crime, in
violation of a statute of limitations.19 Although such a motion would
have resulted in dismissal of the indictment, the court held that the
defendant had not been denied effective assistance of counsel.1 94 The
court reasoned that, once the trial did occur, counsel performed com-
petently by filing omnibus motions, making cogent opening and clos-
ing statements, making appropriate objections, and obtaining
dismissal of the other counts of the indictment, which were felo-
nies.19 Thus, "[u]nder the circumstances, counsel's representation,
viewed in its entirety, was meaningful." '96 It is unconvincing, how-
ever, to assert that counsel's performance at trial was constitutionally
adequate when the very claim of ineffectiveness consists in the fact
that there should not have been a trial at all.
Courts seem to believe that if they do acknowledge and criticize
counsel's "isolated" error, then somehow they can proceed to con-
clude that the overall performance was effective. 197 This is exactly
what happened in People v. Tippins.9 8 Although it was clear that coun-
sel had fallen asleep during the trial, the court asserted, "Although a
defense counsel's sleeping during the course of a trial is reprehensi-
190. See id. at 161 ("Effective assistance of counsel is gauged by the totality of the repre-
sentation from the pretrial representation of the accused through the punishment stage of
the trial." (citing Ex parteWelborn, 785 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Exparte
Walker, 777 S.W.2d 427, 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989))).
191. Id. (citing Cannon v. State, 668 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)); see Peo-
ple v. Noble, 647 N.Y.S.2d 304, 305 (App. Div. 1996) (stating that the failure of counsel to
have communicated with his client until the eve of trial did not constitute ineffective assist-
ance because the required cumulative errors were not present).
192. 565 N.Y.S.2d 650 (App. Div. 1990).
193. Id. at 650.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 650-51.
196. Id. at 651 (citing People v. Carter, 545 N.Y.S.2d 856 (App. Div. 1989)).
197. But see Mitchell v. State, 974 S.W.2d 161, 165-67 (Tex. App. 1998), vacate4, No. 849-
98, 1999 WL 152265 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 17, 1999) (holding that the failure of counsel
to prevent his client from wearing the same distinctive T-shirt at trial that the perpetrator
had worn in a videotape of the crime so "permeated the trial" that the error alone consti-
tuted ineffectiveness).
198. 570 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1991).
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ble, the transcript of the trial and the hearing on the motion to vacate
... , when viewed in totality, reveal that the defendant was provided
with meaningful representation."' 99 The Supreme Court, predictably,
denied certiorari. 210 Similarly, in McFarland v. State,2 1 a case in which
the defendant was sentenced to death, the court determined that, be-
cause ineffectiveness cannot "be established by isolating one portion
of trial counsel's performance,"20 2 the defendant was not entitled to
relief, even though the court found that trial counsel's error had per-
mitted the prosecutor to comment impermissibly on her client's fail-
ure to testify and his post-arrest silence.20 3
Courts may combine the characterization of an error as trial strat-
egy with the analysis that the counsel's performance as a whole was
competent. The result may be deadly-especially for defendants,
such as the one in Romero v. Lynaugh.2°4 After the jury returned its
guilty verdict in this case, the punishment phase began for the jury to
determine whether or not the defendant should receive the death
penalty.2 5 This phase is expected to be time consuming, with defense
counsel permitted, in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision
in Lockett v. Ohio,20 6 to call witnesses-lay and expert-to present any-
thing and everything that a jury might consider as mitigating factors
calling for a sentence other than death.2 7 The entire case of the sen-
tencing proceeding presented by counsel in Romero was as follows:
Defense Counsel: Ladies and Gentlemen, I appreciate the
time you took deliberating and the thought you put into this.
199. Id. at 582-83.
200. Tippins v. New York, 502 U.S. 1064 (1992).
201. 845 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc), overruled by Bingham v. Texas,
915 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc).
202. Id. at 843.
203. See id. at 844 (stating that the defendant satisfied the first part of the Strickland test,
but failed to demonstrate that his defense was prejudiced by counsel's failure to object).
204. 884 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1989). The defendant in this case participated in the rape
and beating-to-death of a 15-year-old girl. Id. at 873.
205. Id. at 872.
206. See 438 U.S. 586, 604, 604-09 (1978) (plurality opinion) (finding unconstitutional a
statute limiting the factors that can be considered as mitigating in a capital sentencing
proceeding on the ground that the Eighth Amendment requires that "any aspect of a de-
fendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defend-
ant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death" must be able to be presented as
mitigating factors).
207. See, e.g., N.Y. Crm PRoc. LAw § 400.27(9) (f) (McKinney Supp. 1998) (complying
with Lockett by allowing "[a] ny other circumstance concerning the crime, the defendant's
state of mind or condition at the time of the crime, or the defendant's character, back-
ground or record" to be introduced as mitigation in a capital sentencing proceeding).
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I'm going to be extremely brief. I have a reputation for not
being brief. Jesse, stand up. Jesse?
The Defendant: Sir?
Defense Counsel: Stand up.
You are an extremely intelligent jury. You've got that
man's life in your hands. You can take it or not. That's all I
have to say.2°8
The federal district court vacated the death sentence, finding that
both prongs of Strickland20 9 were met.210 The district court found that
counsel had precluded the jury from consideration of valid mitigating
factors in violation of the constitutional rights guaranteed in Lockett.
2 11
The district court mentioned three examples of mitigating evidence
that counsel could have presented: that defendant Romero was just a
teenager when the incident occurred, that he was intoxicated at the
time, and that his family background might have made his acts more
"understandable" to the jury.212
The Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that counsel's "representa-
tion" at the sentencing phase of the trial was not ineffective. 213 The
court found that although counsel "did not present evidence at the
sentencing phase of trial,"2 14 the attorney was "an experienced trial
lawyer" who had "engaged in substantial preparation for trial. '2 15 In
rather oblique language that seemed almost to compliment the coun-
sel for his "strategy" at the sentencing phase, the Fifth Circuit asserted
that "we are not prepared to fault [counsel's] effort to highlight the
heavy responsibility of the jury by not burdening them" with present-
ing specific factors of mitigation.
1 6
The court added a truism that could apply to any performance
labeled "strategic," regardless of how incompetent, ineffective, or ab-
surd the representation was: "Had the jury returned a life sentence
the strategy [of highlighting the jury's heavy responsibility in sentenc-
208. Romero, 884 F.2d at 875.
209. See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
210. Romero, 884 F.2d at 876.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 879.
214. Id. at 877.
215. Id.
216. Id. The court did note that the mitigating factors of the defendant's youth was
obvious to the jury, that his sister had presented some information about his family life
during her trial testimony, and that the trial record belied any suggestion that he was so
intoxicated as to be less morally culpable, so that "evidence of possible mitigating factors
was before the jury." Id.
14631999]
MARY AND LAW REVIEW
ing without presenting potentially mitigating evidence] might well
have been seen as a brilliant move." 217 If counsel had done virtually
nothingfor the entire trial, as opposed to just at the sentencing phase,
the court could have deemed that to be strategic-perhaps counsel
had been hoping that no jury would sentence a defendant to death
when he had been so poorly represented. Then, the court could have
reasoned, as it did in Romero, that the representation could not be
considered ineffective because, had the "strategy" worked, it would
have been brilliant.
Any expectation that an appeal based on an appropriate ineffec-
tiveness claim will be successful relies, of course, on the belief that
appellate counsel will be competent. In any direct appeal of right, a
defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel.218 Stan-
dard 4-8.6(a) of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards instructs appel-
late counsel that if they are "satisfied that another defense counsel...
did not provide effective assistance, he or she should not hesitate to
seek relief for the defendant on that ground."" 9 Yet appellate coun-
sel suffer from the same excessive caseloads that have rendered trial
counsel ineffective. 220 This problem became so severe in 1996 in Illi-
nois that the United States District Court had to intervene. In United
States ex rel. Green v. Washington, the Illinois Office of the State Appel-
late Defender (OSAD) represented a class of indigent defendants
challenging delay in the appellate process.221 The class claimed that
the Illinois legislature had known of the severe backlog of unbriefed
appellate cases for years, and that the "funding level is plainly insuffi-
cient to enable OSAD to employ enough staff to address the growth in
appointments and backlog that OSAD's district, offices have exper-
ienced in the last three years." 2 The caseload problems had also
217. Id.
218. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (holding that "[a] first appeal as of
right... is not adjudicated in accord with due process of law if the appellant does not have
the effective assistance of an attorney").
219. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE, supra note 4, Standard 4-8.6(a) & cmt. (warning
that appellate lawyers must ensure that their personal regard for the trial lawyer not influ-
ence their judgment because "[n]othing would be more destructive of the goals of effec-
tive assistance of counsel and justice than to immunize the misconduct of a lawyer by the
unwillingness of other lawyers to expose their inadequacy").
220. Cf., e.g.,Jackson v. Leonardo, 162 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 1998) (involving an appellate
lawyer who was so neglectful and careless as to fail to raise a "well-established, straightfor-
ward, and obvious double jeopardy claim").
221. 917 F. Supp. 1238, 1240-41 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
222. Id. at 1248; see Randall Samborn, Funding Cuts Spark Court Crisis, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 31,
1992, available in Westdaw, 8/31/99 Nat'l LJ. 3 (reporting that the state appellate defender
in Chicago sought to withdraw from ten capital cases because inadequate funding pre-
vented the office from filing timely briefs); see also Indigent Defense Report, supra note 41,
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impacted upon the appeals by defendants other than those repre-
sented by that Office.223
A similar set of problems caused by inadequate funding existed in
Florida. In In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals By Tenth Judicial
Circuit Public Defender,224 the Florida Supreme Court informed the
state legislature that if sufficient funds were not appropriated and ad-
ditional appellate defenders hired within three months of the court's
opinion, it would hear habeas corpus petitions from defendants
whose appeals were delayed due to the case overload.225
Needless to say, the more time between the date of conviction
and the commencement of the appeal on ineffectiveness grounds, the
less chance there will be for appellate counsel to provide effective rep-
resentation. For example, if the allegation of ineffectiveness concerns
trial counsel's failure to investigate witnesses, then delay makes it even
more difficult for appellate counsel to locate those witnesses required
to show how the defendant was prejudiced by his trial counsel's inade-
quate investigation.226 Increased delay makes it more difficult both to
find the witnesses and for those witnesses to remember details rele-
vant to the defendant's case. And, the more unmanageable any par-
ticular appellate lawyer's caseload is, the less able the lawyer will be to
do the work needed to illustrate that a defendant has been
prejudiced.227
Appellate counsel's task is also made more difficult by courts'
adopting Strickland's caveat that "[a] fair assessment of attorney per-
at 54 (explaining that excessive caseloads in New York City have caused the Criminal Ap-
peals Bureau of the Legal Aid Society to require so much time to file the appeal brief after
receiving assignment of the case that the Performance Standards enacted by the appellate
court were routinely violated).
223. See Green, 917 F. Supp. at 1248 (quoting Illinois Supreme Court Chief Justice
Michael Bilandic in his annual report to the General Assembly, which indicated lengthy
delays for "indigent defendants represented by the state appellate defender and the Cook
County public defender"). A particularly interesting aspect of this federal litigation was
the testimony of an expert witness-a forensic psychiatrist-that the severe delays in wait-
ing for the processing of the appeals had put the incarcerated individuals "at an increased
risk of suffering a range of adverse psychological reactions (including anxiety, mistrust,
fear, hopelessness and depression)." Id. at 1264.
224. 561 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1990).
225. Id. at 1138-39.
226. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Cross v. DeRobertis, 811 F.2d 1008, 1016 (7th Cir.
1987) ("Under usual circumstances, we would expect that such information [concerning
testimony that missing witnesses would have offered] would be presented to the habeas
court through the testimony of the potential witnesses.").
227. See Wingate v. United States, 669 A.2d 1275, 1287 (D.C. 1995) (indicating that the
task of proving prejudice is substantial because "[a] court cannot engage in sheer specula-
tion about what an investigation by counsel might have revealed or what witnesses he
might have called" (citing Williams v. United States, 421 A.2d 19, 25 (D.C. 1980))).
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formance requires every effort be made to eliminate the distorting ef-
fects of hindsight."228 Why is it "distorted" to look back and see that
counsel should have made motions that were not made,229 should not
have been intoxicated throughout the trial,230 should have had at least
some time to prepare,23 1 should have contacted potentially important
witnesses, 23 2 should not be representing a client who was being prose-
cuted by the same office that was prosecuting counsel,233 should have
been receiving at least some compensation for the unsolicited and un-
desired court appointment,234 should have presented some evidence of
mitigation in the punishment phase of death penalty case,235 or at
least should have been awake during the trial of his client?23 6
Another problem is presented at the appellate level by Strick-
land's second "but for" or prejudice prong. Frequently, appellate
courts, at the Supreme Court's invitation, first examine the strength
of the prosecutor's case to determine the likelihood of the defend-
ant's having been found not guilty. 23 7 If the court determines that the
case was so strong that the defendant's attorney could not have at-
228. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (emphasis added).
229. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 366 (1993) (holding that defense coun-
sel's failure to make an objection at a sentencing hearing did not render counsel's repre-
sentation ineffective).
230. See, e.g., People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419, 440 (Cal. 1989) (in bank) (holding that
defendant must show that counsel's alcoholic tendencies adversely affected his ability to
provide defendant with effective assistance of counsel).
231. See, e.g., Avery v. Procunier, 750 F.2d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that effective
assistance of counsel was provided under Strickland, even though counsel was only ap-
pointed on the morning the trial was set to begin).
232. See, e.g., State v. Aplaca, 837 P.2d 1298, 1305-08 (Haw. 1992) (discussing defense
counsel's failure to contact potential defense witnesses).
233. See, e.g., Foy v. United States, 838 F. Supp. 38, 43-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that
defense counsel's representation of a defendant while another U.S. attorney's office was
investigating defense counsel did not satisfy either prong of Strickland).
234. See, e.g., Madden v. Township of Delran, 601 A2d 211, 212-13 (N.J. 1992) (declin-
ing to order the government to pay attorneys who are assigned to represent indigent de-
fendants by the court).
235. See, e.g., Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 876 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that coun-
sel's failure to offer any mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of a capital case did
not constitute ineffective assistance).
236. See, e.g., People v. Tippins, 570 N.Y.S.2d 581, 582-83 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that
defendant received meaningful representation even though defense counsel slept during
portions of the trial).
237. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 697 (1984) (defining prejudice as a
"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different," advising that a court "need not determine whether
counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the de-
fendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies," and noting that "[i]f it is easier to dispose of
an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will
often be so, that course should be followed" (emphasis added)).
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tained a not-guilty verdict, then it is not necessary to "grade counsel's
performance" to determine if there was any deficiency.
2 38
One problem with this prejudice standard is that the record may
not reveal weaknesses in the prosecutor's case because of counsel's in-
competence. For example, counsel might fail to raise an issue on ap-
peal.239 Or, the transcript may reveal no indication of reasonable
doubt in those instances where counsel has failed most horrendously.
A lawyer who would have investigated his client's case carefully, con-
sulted with experts, sought out defense witnesses, filed appropriate
discovery motions and devoted the time needed adequately to pre-
pare for trial, may have both attacked the prosecutor's claims and
presented a case for the defendant that may have led to a not-guilty
verdict. The transcript, of course, will not reflect what ought to have
and would have been done by counsel had he been competent.240 As
Justice Marshall observed in his strong and often caustic dissent 241 in
Strickland: "Seemingly impregnable cases can sometimes be disman-
tled by good defense counsel." 2
42
The second serious problem with the prejudice prong is that ap-
pellate courts since the Strickland decision may find that when the
prosecutor's case is strong, the verdict would have been a guilty one
regardless of how effective counsel's representation was. Therefore,
however incompetent a defendant's lawyer may have been, and how-
ever unfair the trial itself may have been as a result, there will be no
remedy for the "clearly guilty" defendant; the conviction will stand.243
Yet it is the defendant confronted with the strongest case against him
who is most in need of a competent, aggressive, and effective de-
fense. 24 Since when is it no longer a cardinal principle of American
238. Id. at 697.
239. See, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533-39 (1986) (refusing to grant relief from
a sentence imposed after inadmissible testimony was admitted because defense counsel
failed to raise the issue on appeal).
240. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932) (commenting that "neither
[counsel] nor the court could say what a prompt and thoroughgoing investigation might
disclose as to the facts").
241. See Strickland 466 U.S. at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (characterizing the major-
ity's two-prong approach as "unhelpful" and "unacceptable").
242. Id. at 710.
243. See supra notes 237-238 and accompanying text (noting that under Strickland a court
need not consider the deficiency of the lawyer's performance if it finds that the conduct
did not prejudice the defendant). But see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489 (1978)
("[T] his Court has concluded that the assistance of counsel is among those 'constitutional
rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.'"
(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967))).
244. In a rare and insightful opinion, the Court of Appeals of Texas, in Mitchell v. State,
974 S.W.2d 161 (1998), recognized that some defendants are especially in need of effec-
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justice that all-the guilty as well as the innocent-have a right to
effective counsel?245 And is a "fair trial"-which certainly requires
that the defendant have had an effective lawyer-no longer required
before an individual may be deprived of his liberty or receive a sen-
tence of death? We have long recognized the vital importance not
only of a trial which is actually fair,2 46 but also one which is "perceived
to be fair by those affected."247
For the defendant to shoulder the burden of having to demon-
strate a reasonable probability that he would have been acquitted but
for counsel's ineffectiveness, is just another way of saying that the de-
fendant must show that he was innocent.248 Placing the burden on
the defendant flies in the face of many considered decisions from
courts at all levels, even those that accept the relevance of the concept
of prejudice. 249 In traditional harmless error analysis, once the error
has been shown by the defendant to have occurred, then the state has
the burden of proving the absence of prejudice beyond a reasonable
doubt.25 The Chief Judge for the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held
tive, competent counsel. Mitchell had an IQ of 68, had been diagnosed as having a typical
psychosis (not being in touch with reality), had been hospitalized in a state institution for
19 years, and was unable to communicate with his attorney. Id. at 166. The appeals court
concluded that the defendant "desperately required" effective assistance. Id. But see
United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1970) (noting that "[w]hen, as here,
the prosecution has an overwhelming case based on documents and the testimony of disin-
terested witnesses, there is not too much the best defense attorney can do," and finding no
ineffectiveness even though counsel had fallen asleep twice and remarked that he "would
rather walk out on this case and not be on it," and was "not very happy about the entire
thing" but was "just doing a duty").
245. See STANDARDS FOR CPIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, Standard 4-7.6 Commentary
(stating that even when the defendant is guilty and has admitted his guilt to counsel, "were
counsel in this circumstance to forgo vigorous cross-examination of the prosecution's wit-
nesses, counsel would violate the clear duty of zealous representation that is owed the
client").
246. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982) (referring to the constitutional guaran-
tee for a criminal defendant to have "a fair trial and a competent attorney").
247. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 11, at viii. Needless to say, a defendant whose
counsel is clearly unprepared for, and inept at, trial is hardly likely to perceive the trial to
have been a fair one.
248. But see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489 (1978) (focusing on the need for
the trial itself to be a fair one and explaining that, in many instances, the absence of
proper, effective counsel ought to result in the reversal of a conviction without regard to
prejudice).
249. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) ("The right to have the
assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice
calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.").
250. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (noting that "the original com-
mon-law harmless-error rule put the burden on the beneficiary of the error either to prove
that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained judgment"). But
see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630, 637-38 (1993) (holding that the Chapman
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in United States v. DeCoster251 that once a defendant demonstrates that
there was a substantial violation of the required duties of counsel, in-
cluding the duty to conduct an appropriate investigation, then the
state would have the burden of showing lack of prejudice. 2 2 At least
this is consistent with the basic concept of American justice that the
state has the burden of proving the defendant's guilt, as opposed to
the totalitarian regimes we all condemn because they assume guilt and
require the defendant to prove innocence.253
In the death penalty context, the prejudice prong applies not just
to the defendant's conviction, but also to the penalty phase; the de-
fendant must show to a reasonable probability that he would not have
been sentenced to death but for counsel's ineffectiveness. 254 Under
this prong, an appellate court could conclude that, even if the jurors
had heard mitigating evidence at the sentencing proceeding, which
the defendant's counsel should have uncovered and presented, the
jurors still would have determined the death sentence to be appropri-
ate. This conclusion, however, is not necessarily accurate. As any ex-
perienced counsel knows, juries act subjectively. It is extraordinarily
difficult, if not presumptuous, to guess what might lead someone else
to decide to spare the life of an individual. It would be far preferable
for an appellate court to reverse any death sentence once the court
determines that counsel failed to act competently and effectively in his
representation at the penalty phase of a capital case.
In Cronic v. United States, the Tenth Circuit determined that there
was no need to show prejudice once it had been established that "cir-
cumstances hamper[ed] a given lawyer's preparation of a defendant's
standard of harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt is not applicable to habeas
petitions).
251. 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
252. See id. at 1204 (arguing that the state should bear the burden of showing prejudice
in this circumstance because the state has the burden of establishing guilt, and because
proof of prejudice may be absent from the record precisely because counsel was
ineffective).
253. The Supreme Court proudly pronounced in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S 335
(1963), that:
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental
and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very
beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis
on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before im-
partial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law.
Id. at 344.
254. See, e.g., In re Gay, 968 P.2d 476, 511 (Cal. 1998) (applying this "reasonable
probability" standard to counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence at defendant's sen-
tencing proceeding, and reversing defendant's death sentence for ineffectiveness).
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case."255 The court explained that: "This is an eminently reasonable
rule, for there is no way an appellate court can say precisely how a
given case would have been handled by a reasonably diligent and
properly prepared lawyer. The prejudice from lack of preparation
and experience cannot be nicely weighed."256 The Supreme Court
reversed on the same day it decided Strickland v. Washington.25 7 The
Court held that even though the Tenth Circuit had found that coun-
sel had not had adequate time to prepare and investigate the case,258
which had taken the government four and one-half years to prepare
and which had led to a thirteen-count indictment involving thousands
of documents,259 the only way that the conviction could be overturned
was for the defendant to show, under Strickland, that his trial counsel
made specific errors that prejudiced him, i.e. led to the guilty
verdict.260
The ramifications of Strickland need not have been as great as
actually has been the case. State courts are free to interpret rights
provided by their own state constitutions (as the right to counsel
invariably is) differently than the Supreme Court's interpretations of
federal constitutional rights. 261 As Justice Brennan counseled:
255. 675 F.2d 1126, 1128 (10th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
256. Id. (emphasis added).
257. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 667.
258. See id. at 649-50 (noting that after defendant's retained counsel withdrew, the trial
court appointed a young inexperienced lawyer whose practice was in real estate law to
represent the defendant in a very complex case involving an alleged nine million dollar
fraud, but that counsel was allowed only twenty five days to prepare for trial).
259. Id. at 649-50.
260. Id. at 666 & n.41. The Cronic cases provide a fascinating and rather incredible tale.
The defendant was initially convicted in Federal District Court on 11 counts of the 13-
count indictment and received a 25-year prison sentence. The Tenth Circuit overturned
the conviction, holding that Cronic did not have the assistance of counsel guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment. Cronic, 675 F.2d at 1129-30. The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded for a consideration of the ineffectiveness claim "under the standards enunciated
in Strickland v. Washington." See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 666 n.41, 666-67. The District Court
upheld the conviction, but the Tenth Circuit again reversed, finding that the Strickland
prejudice requirement was satisfied because counsel should have raised the defense of
"good faith," which would have constituted a complete defense to the charges. United
States v. Cronic, 839 F.2d 1401, 1403 (10th Cir. 1988). A new trial was ordered, id. at 1404,
at which Cronic was again convicted. See United States v. Cronic, 900 F.2d 1511, 1512 n.1
(10th Cir. 1990) (noting the district court trial). The Tenth Circuit again vacated the
conviction, finding that the defendant's acts did not come within the scope of the United
States mail fraud statute. Id. at 1517. The court made it clear that this, finally, was to be
the end of it: "Our holding that the evidence was legally insufficient renders a retrial upon
these charges impermissible under the Fifth Amendment's DoubleJeopardy Clause." Id. at
1517 (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978)). The defendant's alleged crime
had occurred in 1975; this final decision was reached 15 years later. Id. at 1512 n.1.
261. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REv. 489, 500 (1977) (observing that "examples abound where state courts have
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[S] tate court judges, and also practitioners, do well to scruti-
nize constitutional decisions by federal courts, for only if
they are found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned,
paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying
specific constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim
persuasive weight as guideposts when interpreting counter-
part state guarantees.262
States, however, almost uniformly have adopted the Strickland stan-
dard. 263 The one notable exception is the Supreme Court of Hawaii
which, in the 1993 case of Briones v. State, proudly stated: "We have
explicitly rejected the federal standard of review in ineffective assist-
ance of counsel cases.... [We] have also rejected the double burden
imposed, as well as the remainder of Stricklands and its federal prog-
eny's unduly restrictive view of what actions or omissions of counsel
would constitute 'ineffective assistance. ' '12 ' The Hawaii court specifi-
cally noted that it had previously rejected the prejudice prong as a
"requirement almost impossible to surmount."265 In another previous
case, State v. Aplaca,2 66 where the defense lawyer failed to contact or
call to the stand potentially important witnesses for the defendant,267
the same Hawaii Court held that, "Although we, as an appellate court,
cannot predict the exact effect these prospective witnesses would have
had on the trial court's assessment of [another witness's and the de-
fendant's] credibility, we firmly believe that such testimony could have
had a direct bearing on the ultimate outcome of the case.
The Hawaii Supreme Court is unique not only in the standard it
uses to evaluate ineffectiveness claims, but, unfortunately, unique also
in finding that there was incompetence by counsel. A 1995 study of
nine states and the corresponding federal district courts revealed that
these courts granted only one percent or fewer of the claims of inef-
fective assistance.269 Justice Blackmun, explaining in McFarland v.
independently considered the merits of constitutional arguments and declined to follow
opinions of the United States Supreme Court they find unconvincing, even where the state
and federal constitutions are similarly or identically phrased").
262. Id. at 502.
263. See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en
banc) (noting that "our [state] constitutional and statutory provisions do not create a stan-
dard in ineffective cases that is more protective of a defendant's right than the standard
put forward by the Supreme Court in Strickland').
264. 848 P.2d 966, 977 n.12 (Haw. 1993).
265. Id. at 976 n.ll (citing State v. Smith, 712 P.2d 496, 500 n.7 (Haw. 1986)).
266. 837 P.2d 1298 (Haw. 1992).
267. Id. at 1305-07.
268. Id. at 1308 (emphases added).
269. Victor E. Flango & Patricia McKenna, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court
Convictions, 31 CAL. W. L. REv. 237, 259-60 (1995); see also Floyd Feeney & Patrick G. Jack-
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Scott why, in part, he-would not sustain any further sentences of death,
offered a biting attack on Strickland: "Ten years after the articulation
of that standard, practical experience establishes that the Strickland
test, in application, has failed to protect a defendant's right to be rep-
resented by something more than 'a person who happens to be a law-
yer.'"27 ' Blackmun is not completely alone among the judiciary. The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Sullivan v. Fairman observed that
few individuals seeking relief due to ineffectiveness of counsel "will be
able to pass through the 'eye of the needle' created by Strickland."71
The Chief Justice of Georgia, in his 1993 Annual State of the Judiciary
Address, said of the manner in which courts review ineffectiveness
claims: "We set our sights on the embarrassing target of mediocrity. I
guess that means about halfway.... To my way of thinking, one-half
justice must mean one-half injustice, and one-half injustice is no jus-
tice at all."27 2
No justice at all is perhaps what the defendant received from the
Seventh Circuit in the 1996 case of Holman v. Page.273 The court as-
sumed that counsel had been ineffective in failing to pursue the claim
that post-arrest statements of the defendant were obtained in violation
of his Fourth Amendment rights. 274 But, reiterating the view of Strick-
land that the absence of fairness is no longer the sine qua non that
leads to a reversal of a conviction, the court held that "although coun-
sel may be ineffective in dealing with a defendant's Fourth Amend-
ment claims, the defendant suffers no prejudice under Strickland as a
result."275 The court determined that an error related to the exclu-
sionary rule could not be in itself prejudicial, even when it may be
son, Public Defenders, Assigned Counsel, Retained CounseL Does the Type of Criminal Defense
Counsel Matter?, 22 RuTGERs L.J. 361, 426 (1991) (explaining that an earlier analysis re-
stricted to Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals found that only four percent of post-Strickland
ineffectiveness claims were upheld) (citing Martin C. Calhoun, Comment, How to Thread
the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims, 77 GEo. L.J. 413, 414 n.ll (1988)).
270. 512 U.S. 1256, 1259 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984)). But see Kimmelman v. Morri-
son, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986) (noting that Strickland's standard is highly demanding but
"by no means insurmountable").
271. 819 F.2d 1382, 1391 (7th Cir. 1987) (footnote omitted); see also Fatal Defense, supra
note 157 (explaining that the Fifth Circuit in the years 1984-1990 denied relief 31 times to
those sentenced to death who claimed that they did not receive effective assistance, and
found ineffectiveness only once).
272. See Stephen B. Bright, Glimpses at a Dream Yet To Be Realized, THE CHAMPION, Mar.
1998, at 65 (quoting then Chief Justice of Georgia Harold Clarke).
273. 95 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1996).
274. Id. at 492.
275. Id. at 491-92.
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clear that an effective lawyer would have managed to suppress the un-
constitutionally-obtained statements and thus precluded any convic-
tion.276 The court made this determination because "[f] airness to the
accused has nothing to do with the purpose of the exclusionary
rule."27
7
One-half justice (or less) is perhaps what the defendant in Foy v.
United States278 received. Unbeknownst to Foy, who was being prose-
cuted by the Eastern District of the United States Attorney's Office, his
attorney was being investigated by the Southern District at the same
time.2 7 9 During the period in which the lawyer was providing counsel
to Foy, the lawyer entered into a plea agreement with the United
States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York.280 On
appeal, the defendant claimed that his counsel "used Foy as leverage
to make a deal for himself... for a lighter sentence." 281 The Federal
District Court, applying Strickland, found no prejudice and therefore
refused to vacate Foy's conviction.282
The Court in Strickland was fully aware of the effect that its deci-
sion would have on the operation of indigent defense systems in the
future.283 The Court, however, had the wrong priorities and mis-
placed concerns. The Court rejected the use of "detailed guide-
lines"284 to assess the effectiveness of counsel because such serious
assessment of defense counsel performance "would encourage the
proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges."285 However, careful scru-
tiny and evaluation of the adequacy of representation is absolutely
276. See id. at 492 (noting that, although unprofessional conduct at a suppression hear-
ing can be used as evidence of counsel's overall incompetence, the admission of evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not itself prejudicial under Strickland).
277. See id. at 491 (noting further than the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
police misconduct, not to ensure fair trials, which is why "Fourth Amendment claims can-
not be raised on habeas review" (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976))).
278. 838 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
279. Id. at 44.
280. Id. The lawyer was being prosecuted for fraud in the filing of a mortgage applica-
tion; the prosecutors withdrew their initial cooperation agreement with the lawyer after
they concluded that the lawyer was not being truthful. Id. The lawyer ultimately did plead,
however, and received a sentence of 12 months imprisonment and three years supervised
release. Id.
281. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (ellipsis in original).
282. Id. at 43-45.
283. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 708 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Stricklands objective reasonableness standard for assessing representation is
vague, that it will discourage the development of minimum standards of defense counsel
performance, and that it overlooks the difference in quality between paid representation
and appointed or public representation).
284. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
285. Id.
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necessary given the widely acknowledged crisis discussed above.28 6 If
such a "proliferation" were to occur it would indicate that the Sixth
Amendment had been given some teeth. The challenges would be
made because it would become clear that many counsel simply were
not, for whatever reason, doing what they should. Given all that is
known about the inadequacies of defense counsel, could one legiti-
mately fear that appeals based on that claim would be uniformly with-
out merit?
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Strickland strains credibility in
reaching for reasons to avoid a decision that would establish the need
for appellate courts to conduct a careful analysis of defense counsel's
representation. Justice O'Connor claims that:
Counsel's performance and even willingness to serve could
be adversely affected. Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid
requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ar-
dor and impair the independence of defense counsel, dis-
courage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine
the trust between attorney and client.
287
The "ardor" of public defenders is dampened alright, on a day to day
basis, by the horrific caseloads counsel are carrying due to the un-
derfunding that has resulted from counties which know that they
need not provide appropriate funding because Strickland requires so
little to be done by counsel.288 It is not only the defenders themselves
whose ardor is dampened. A recent survey of public defender offices
by the National Institute of Justice revealed that sixty percent of the
heads of public defender offices stated that heavy caseloads have led
to difficulty in recruiting new lawyers to join their offices.289 Eighty per-
cent of the defenders surveyed believed that the increase in caseloads
has not led to a corresponding increase in defenders. 290 And as for
286. See supra notes 11-68 and accompanying text. The Justices would not even have had
to engage in extensive research to have discovered the problem of adequate indigent de-
fense counsel. Prior to Strickland, one of their own-former Chief Justice Warren Bur-
ger-wrote, "In some places it is the observation ofjudges that the Criminal Justice Act has
not brought about improvement in the general quality of criminal defense and that per-
formance has not been generally adequate-either by assigned private counsel or by the public
defender office." Burger, supra note 143, at 237 (emphasis added). Similar criticism had
also been made by the Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, see generally David
L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1973), and the Chief
Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, seegenerally Kaufman, supra note 141.
287. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
288. See supra notes 30-68 and accompanying text.
289. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OFJUSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: PRELIMINARY SUR-
VEY RESULTS OF PUBLIC DEFENDERS 1-4 (1990).
290. Id.
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"discouraging the acceptance of assigned cases" by counsel,2 l most
states, because of Strickland's failure to require much work, time, and
preparation by counsel, have instituted "caps," or maximum amounts
of payment to assigned counsel for any one case. 212 These caps often
provide reimbursement for serious felony cases at a maximum of ten
to fifteen hours per case.293 O'Connor's Strickland opinion had things
in reverse, because higher standards would have required more fund-
ing for the additional time the assigned counsel would have had to
devote to each case.294 The work, therefore, would become more at-
tractive. Furthermore, attorneys who are expected to work so few
hours on a case lose respect for themselves and their work, and fewer
new lawyers wish to join their ranks. Strickland professed concern that
lawyers may not wish to take cases if their effectiveness may be chal-
lenged; yet Strickland allows (or caused) such routine ineffectiveness
that many lawyers most certainly do shun court assignments to repre-
sent the indigent defendant.
295
At least when they can. In parts of New Jersey, they cannot. In a
recent decision that again illustrates how the message of Strickland is
virtually "anything goes," the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld a
system under which all lawyers licensed to practice in New Jersey and
doing so in the Township of Delran were required to accept, with no
291. See text accompanying note 287.
292. See Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render
the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363, 364-75 (1993).
293. See Stephanie Saul, When Death is the Penalty: Attorneys for Poor Defendants Often Lack
Experience and Skill, NEW YoRK NEWSDAY, Nov. 25, 1991, at 8 (suggesting that although many
states do permit counsel to charge for a higher number of hours in a death penalty case,
the permissible time in no way approaches the 400 to 1000 hours that experts estimate are
required to conduct the investigation and research required for a capital case).
294. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (asserting that higher stan-
dards would discourage attorneys from accepting assigned cases).
295. The American Bar Association has repeatedly expressed concern about the lack of
desire by attorneys to accept court assigned cases. For example, the A.B.A.'s Special Com-
mittee on Criminal Justice in a Free Society stated that, with the exception of public de-
fenders and a very small private bar:
the trial bar is not fulfilling its obligation to participate through the representa-
tion of indigent defendants, and as a result, the status of the practice of criminal
law suffers. Moreover, the shunning of criminal practice deprives the criminal
justice system of a powerful voice for criminal justice reform, because the influen-
tial lawyers are unfamiliar with the working of the criminal justice system.
CRIMINALJUSTICE IN CmsIs, supra note 18, at 7-8. As to the goal of recruiting the powerful
to demand reforms, one commentator has called for prohibiting any individual regardless
of wealth from utilizing privately retained counsel in a criminal case. Acknowledging that
the indigent have no political power, "[t]his proposal is a way to recruit the wealthy into
becoming advocates for the improvement of our impoverished defense system." See Leroy
D. Clark, All Defendants, Rich and Poor, Should Get Appointed Counsel in Criminal Cases: The
Route to True Equal Justice, 81 MARQ. L. Rav. 47, 78 (1997).
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compensation whatsoever, court appointment to represent indigent
defendants.296 All lawyers-those who had no criminal experience,
those who detested the practice of criminal law (if not defendants
themselves), those whose knowledge and practice of law never encom-
passed the courtroom at all-were included.297 The Supreme Court
of New Jersey upheld a system whereby uninterested (if not antagonis-
tic) lawyers with no knowledge of or experience in criminal law would,
against their will and without pay (to further dampen their enthusi-
asm), provide representation to indigent defendants whose liberty was
at stake. 298 The court obviously thought that such nonadequate rep-
resentation would not be prohibited under Strickland, so why worry if,
for example, this system would violate the National Legal Aid and De-
fender Association's Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representa-
tion 2 " and the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice."°
296. Madden v. Township of Delran, 601 A.2d 211, 212, 221-23 (N.J. 1992). This ap-
proach directly violates the ABA Standards for CriminalJustice, which provide in pertinent
part that "[a]ssigned counsel should receive prompt compensation at a reasonable hourly
rate." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE, supra note 4, Standard 5-2.4, at 39. In spite of this
ABA Standard, a similar situation to that in New Jersey has occurred in Tennessee. The
judges in Knoxville, knowing that the state indigent defense fund providing for payment of
court assigned counsel had been virtually depleted, ordered every licensed attorney-in-
cluding the mayor-to take cases of indigent defendants even if the attorney had abso-
lutely no experience in criminal matters. Tennessee Indigent Defense System in Crisis, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, Spring 1992, at 42.
297. See Madden, 601 A.2d at 217, 219 (noting the "certainty[ ] that some attorneys will
be assigned who have no experience either in municipal court or indeed in any court").
298. Id. at 212, 217. The court had before it a case brought by a lawyer who had been
appointed, against his will, to represent indigent defendants. Id. at 213-14. Because there
was no compensation provided, the lawyer claimed that the mandated assignment was an
unconstitutional taking of property without due process or just compensation, and that it
violated equal protection because the only lawyers who would be assigned by the court
were those counsel who regularly appeared in municipal court. Id. at 216-17. Treating the
latter claim as the primary one, the court disagreed, noting that the assignment system
appeared to select attorneys randomly from among all licensed practicing attorneys. Id. at
217. Consequently, the NewJersey Supreme Court did not grant the requested relief, but
instead modified the system slightly to ensure the random nature and fairness of the as-
signments. Id. at 218.
299. See NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, PERFORMANCE GUIDELNES FOR
CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION Guideline 1.2(b) (1997) ("Prior to handling a criminal
matter, counsel should have sufficient experience or training to provide quality representa-
tion.").
300. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 4, Standard 5-2.2 & cmt., at 34
(rejecting the idea that all members of the bar should be required to provide representa-
tion to indigent defendants because only "qualified" members should do so); see also Indi-
gent Defense Report, supra note 41, at 11 (indicating that the vital importance of training
in the law and art of criminal defense was recognized even by the impoverished New York
City Legal Aid Society, which even in the hardest of times realized the need to continue its
extensive and intensive training program).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court explained that it was aware that
lawyers who had never stepped foot in a courtroom would now be in
charge of cases affecting freedom of their clients. 301 The court was
also aware that "financial pressures on unpaid counsel can affect their
performance."30 2 But the court responded to the expected criticisms
by stating that the Sixth Amendment provided only for the "right to
counsel" and certainly "not to the best counsel."30 3 One can rest as-
sured that indigents in that town will not be receiving "the best
counsel."
In Strickland,3 °4 the Supreme Court was confronted for the first
time with the task of determining the standard to be used for assessing
the effectiveness of counsel in a criminal case. The Court had the
opportunity to render an opinion that could have benefitted untold
numbers of indigents represented by court-appointed private attor-
neys or public defenders.3 0 ' The competency of defense counsel had
long been of concern306 and the Court's decision was eagerly awaited
by those associations of attorneys most involved with providing and
assessing defense services. 30 7 The opinion of the Court, while imme-
diately subjected to harsh analysis and criticism,30 8 has had an impact
even the strongest critics had not imagined.
The Strickland opinion seemed to ignore the lofty language of
previous decisions. In Kent v. United States, the Court had opined that
"[t] he right to representation by counsel is not a formality. It is not a
grudging gesture to a ritualistic requirement. It is of the essence of
justice."309 So too the sentiment that "the lawyer is the one person to
whom society as a whole looks as the protector of the legal rights of that
person in his dealings with the police and the court."" 0 The Strick-
301. Madden, 601 A.2d at 219; cf Mark Hansen, Criminal Crash Course, 78 A.B.A J., Apr.
1992, at 14, 14 (reporting a similar occurrence in Knoxville, Tennessee, where a caseload
crisis led judges in general sessions court to appoint 1200 practicing and nonpracticing
lawyers to represent defendants without compensation).
302. Madden, 601 A.2d at 219 (emphasis added).
303. Id. at 215 (emphasis added).
304. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
305. Approximately 75% of all inmates in state prisons were indigents represented by
court-appointed defenders in 1991, the most recent year that the Department of Justice
conducted such a survey. Bureau ofJustice Statistics, Selected Findings: Indigent Defense, Feb.
1996, at 1. The study also revealed that almost 50% of all inmates were black. Id. at 3.
306. See supra notes 12-18.
307. See, for example, the amicus curiae brief submitted by the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association urging Supreme Court affirmance of the Fifth Circuit's holding in
Strickland.
308. See supra note 5.
309. 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966) (emphasis added).
310. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979) (emphasis added).
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land Court's holding that the conviction of a defendant who was in-
competently represented need not be reversed3 1 ' certainly seems to
fly in the face of the forceful language in In re Gault: 312 "Due process
of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual free-
dom. It is the basic and essential term in the social compact which
defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the
state may exercise."3
13
Our criminal justice system must be effectively adversarial.3" 4
The Strickland Court's clear diminution of the import of effective
counsel, especially for the defendant who appears to be guilty,315 has
led to a situation in the state and federal courts of this country
wherein defense counsel are routinely denied the time and resources
with which to challenge the prosecutor's case.31 6 Analysts of our sys-
tem for delivering defense services often refer to the post-Strickland
standard for effectiveness of defense counsel as the "foggy mirror
test": If a mirror is placed in front of defense counsel during the trial
and it does in fact fog, then counsel is deemed to be effective.3 17 The
Court has reduced the Sixth Amendment right to one of form over
substance. 18
Efficiency, rather than justice, may well be the most important
attribute and goal of our criminal justice system. The rapid process-
311. According to the Court, such a reversal is to occur only if the defendant has shown
that but for counsel's errors, there would have been no guilty verdict. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
312. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
313. Id. at 20. The Court itself gave a caveat in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976),
that it may have failed to honor in Strickland: "[C]ourts must be alert to factors that may
undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process." Id. at 503.
314. Just three years before Strickland, the Court reminded us of the critical import of
our reliance upon the adversarial system: "The [criminal justice] system assumes that ad-
versarial testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and fairness." Polk
County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981).
315. The Sixth Amendment constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel ap-
plies, of course, to the guilty as well as to the innocent, and the mandates of the ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility that counsel act diligently to provide zealous representation
and never neglect one's client apply to the guilty as well as the innocent accused of crime.
The Court itself in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), recognized that every defend-
ant is entitled to a lawyer who is "an active advocate in behalf of his client." Id. at 744; see
also Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 158 (1988) (noting that the purpose of the Sixth
Amendment is to guarantee an effective counsel for every defendant).
316. See supra notes 19-68.
317. See, e.g., RANDALL COYNE, CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 148
(1995).
318. The Gideon Court had recognized what the Strickland Court failed to: "From the
very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on
procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials...." Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
1478
INEFFEIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
ing of cases, the emphasis on pleas, and the evaluation ofjudges based
on their rate of disposition have long been the modus operandi in the
state criminal courts.31 9 One might have expected more from the
Supreme Court, yet Strickland's emphasis on the need for the Court to
avoid any holding which might "encourage the proliferation of inef-
fectiveness challenges"3 20 just adds the Supreme Court to the list of
those who consider fairness and justice to be of only secondary im-
port. The Court's fear of providing a holding which might promote
post-trial inquiries into the effectiveness of counsel, or to set detailed
standards or guidelines to assess counsel competency, has enabled
those who determine funding for counsel for the indigent to set budg-
ets which prevent attorneys from providing effective representation.
The Court may well have had the support of the public if it had
provided a decision that would have given meat to the Sixth Amend-
ment requirement for effective counsel. Unlike some of the Court's
holdings on Fourth or Fifth Amendment procedural concerns, the de-
cision in Gideon 2 1 is considered to be one of the Court's most popu-
lar. 2' The right to effective counsel is in many ways the most
fundamental of all constitutional protections; it is through counsel
that all the other rights are asserted and preserved. By failing to "pro-
scribe second-class performances by counsel,"3 23 the Court has led us
down a path which has constitutionalized the inadequate, incompe-
tent, ineffective assistance of counsel. And the individual whose coun-
sel does not provide adequate, competent and effective
representation may be no better off than the defendant who simply
has no lawyer at all.
319. See, e.g., Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact on
Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REv. 531 (1988).
320. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1989).
321. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
322. Professor Yale Kasimar, for instance, has observed that Gideon is "one of the most
popular decisions ever handed down by the United States Supreme Court." Yale Kasimar,
The Gideon Case 25 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1988, at A27.
323. Judge David Bazelon, former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit and a lifelong advocate of quality representation for the indigent defendant, has
written that "[i]f the Sixth Amendment is to serve a central role in eliminating second-class
justice for the poor, then it must proscribe second-class performances by counsel." United
States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (Bazelon, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added). Instead of seeking to condemn ineffective representation, the Court's
Strickland decision may be read as lending support to a comment such as that made by the
President of the New York City Legal Aid Society. While defending the Society from sharp
criticism regarding the quality of representation provided by Legal Aid, the president said,
"If Gideon meant that someone should have a lawyer who can devote all the time required
for a case, we fall somewhat short." The Legal Aid Society on the Defensive, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
1995, § 4, at 7. Of course, effective lawyering means doing all that is required; in recent
years, however, courts have systematically accepted far less.
14791999]
